Abatement strategies and the cost of environmental regulation: emission standards on the European car market by Reynaert, Mathias
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
DPS14.31 
 
NOVEMBER 2014 
Abatement strategies and 
the cost of environmental 
regulation:  
Emission standards on the 
European car market 
 
Mathias REYNAERT 
Econometrics 
Faculty of Economics 
And Business 
Abatement Strategies and the Cost of Environmental Regulation:
Emission Standards on the European Car Market.
Job Market Paper
Mathias Reynaert
October 2014
Abstract
Emission standards are one of the major policy tools to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions from transportation. The welfare e¤ects from this type of regulation depend
on how rms choose to abate emissions: by changing relative prices, by downsizing
their eet or by adopting technology. This paper studies the response of rms to a
new emission standard in the European car market using panel data covering 1998-
2011. The data show that rms choose to comply with the regulation by adopting new
technology. To evaluate the welfare e¤ects of the regulation I estimate a structural
model using data from before the policy announcement and explicitly test the ability
of the model to explain the observed responses. I nd that, because the abatement
is done by technology adoption, consumer welfare increases and overall welfare e¤ects
depend on market failures in the technology market. The design of the regulation
matters to induce technology adoption.
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1 Introduction
Transportation accounts for 20% of global greenhouse gas emissions and policy makers are
taking up the challenge to reduce the use of polluting petroleum liquids. The major policy
tool used to control emissions in transportation are regulations that set mandatory limits
on average emission rates (or fuel economy) across the eet. These policies are simple to
prescribe but di¢ cult to evaluate because their welfare impact depends on the way in which
rms choose to comply, that is whether rms choose to change prices, downsize their eet
or adopt new technologies. The European Union (EU) recently began rolling out its rst
greenhouse gas emission regulation regime.
The EU emission standard limits sales weighted CO2 emissions across the eet to 130
g/km. The regulation was announced in 2007 and is fully binding by 2015, after a phase-in
period that started in 2012. The regulation places a simple cap on the average emissions of
new vehicle sales and does not allow rms to trade excess emissions. The regulation aims
to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars by 18%. The EU standard is signicantly
more demanding than similar regulations in Australia, Canada, China and the US. The EU
standard translates into about 42 miles per gallon (mpg)1 for gasoline engines, whereas the
Corporate Average Fuel E¢ ciency (CAFE) standard in the US requires only 36 mpg in 2016.
In recent years most governments have decided on, or are discussing a further tightening of
emission standards.2 The observed response to the EU standards can thus be regarded as
an important signal for future responses in other markets across the world.
This paper evaluates the EU emission standard using panel data covering 1998-2011 for
seven European countries. The paper makes several contributions. First, this paper uses
an approach new to the literature that studies the CAFE standards in the US. I observe a
stong policy shock, from no standard to one of the most stringent standards in the world
and nd that the EU emission standard induces technology adoption by rms, an abatement
strategy not considered in the existing literature. Second, I estimate a structural model
of demand and supply to show that the incidence and the welfare e¤ects of the regulation
are very di¤erent under technology adoption than under other possible abatement strategies
previously considered in the literature. Third, the paper gives an example of how to validate
1Note that miles per gallon is the inverse of liters per 100 km, the unit to denote fuel e¢ ciency in the
EU. Liters per 100 km translates proportionally into grams of CO2 per km, with a di¤erent CO2 content
per liter for diesel and gasoline.
2The International Council on Clean Transportation (2014) compares di¤erent regulations between coun-
tries. The EU has the goal of decreasing emissions to 95g/km by 2021, the US has communicated a goal of
103 g/km by 2025, Japan 105g/km by 2020 and China 117g/km by 2020.
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structural models before simulating di¤erent counterfactual outcomes. Fourth, to the best
of my knowledge, this is the rst paper providing a detailed evaluation of the EU regulation.
Fifth, I study the impact of the attribute-based design of the regulation, so that the emission
target varies with vehicle weight, and nd that this is important to induce abatement by
technology adoption. My analysis proceeds in several steps.
In a rst step I explain the sources of the observed 14% reduction in sales weighted
CO2 emission between 2007 and 2011. A rst strategy to abate emissions is changing the
sales mix. By shifting relative prices of vehicles with di¤erent fuel e¢ ciency rms lower
the average emission of their existing eet. I call this sales mix abatement. A second
strategy is abatement through the release of smaller but more fuel e¢ cient vehicles, I call
this downsizing. A last abatement strategy of rms is the introduction of new technology
that makes engines more fuel e¢ cient. Following the approach of Knittel (2011), I estimate
technological improvements in the trade-o¤ that rms face between fuel e¢ ciency and other
engine characteristics. I nd that the 14% reduction in emissions between 2007 and 2011 is
fully explained by increases in the adoption of technology. The reduction cannot be explained
by downsizing of the vehicle eet neither by sales-mixing. The increase in fuel e¢ ciency
from technology is so strong that almost all of the rms reach the target of the regulation
before it becomes partly binding in 2012. This allows me to evaluate the policy without
data that covers the actual binding stage of the program. The response to the regulation
between announcement and full implementation reveals the abatement strategy chosen by
the rms. These ndings are in contrast with the literature that studies the e¤ects of the
CAFE regulation in the US. This literature mostly treats changes in the level of technology
as a possible longer run e¤ect of the regulation and has focused on the e¤ects from changes
in relative prices and more recently, changes in other product characteristics.
Goldberg (1998) was the rst to consider the e¤ect of standards on price setting and the
composition of the vehicle eet. Jacobsen (2013) builds on this analysis by incorporating
heterogenous responses from both consumers and producers. He nds that the CAFE stan-
dard imposes a large shadow cost on the domestic US rms. A one mile per gallon increase
in the CAFE standard is predicted to reduce the sum of consumer surplus and prots by
at least $20 billion per year. This result is somewhat in contrast with Anderson and Sallee
(2011) who, using a loophole in the regulation, show that the standard is hardly binding in
recent years and imposes a very low shadow cost on producers. Both Klier and Linn (2012)
and Whitefoot, Fowlie and Skerlos (2013) extend the analysis by considering endogenous
product characteristics in the model. Both papers estimate a model that allows car makers
to respond in the short run by adapting the sales mix through prices and in the medium
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run through adapting the type of products they o¤er. This softens the welfare e¤ects of
the regulation in the long run as rms have a greater exibility on how to react to the
standard. Still, Klier and Linn (2012) report yearly welfare losses in the order of $13 billion
of a one mile per gallon increase in the standard. This literature simulates the e¤ects of a
tightening in the CAFE standards while the EU regulation provides me a unique and strong
policy shock: the announcement and implementation of a very strict and binding emission
standard. The response to this policy shock reveals that technology adoption is the primary
abatement strategy to the EU regulation. The US literature does not take this into account.
The incidence of the regulation under technology adoption and the overall welfare e¤ects are
an empirical question. The e¤ect on consumer surplus is uncertain as buyers trade-o¤ lower
fuel costs with higher prices. The e¤ect on prots is uncertain as demand, marginal cost and
competing products change.
In the second step I therefore estimate and explicitly validate a structural model that
will allow me to simulate the welfare e¤ects from technology adoption and to compare the
e¤ects with those of other abatement strategies. The model allows for heterogenous tastes of
consumers for several characteristics, including fuel costs. I follow the methodology proposed
by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), denoted as BLP. Marginal costs are estimated through
the rst order conditions assuming an oligopoly Nash-Bertrand game on the supply side. I
instrument for prices using cost data on the location of production.
Before calculating welfare e¤ects from policy simulations it is important to asses the
ability of the structural model to predict counterfactual outcomes. In recent years there
have been questions regarding the validity of structural estimation in general, see for example
Angrist and Pischke (2010), and of the BLP model in particular, see for example Knittel
and Metaxoglou (2014). I try to address these concerns in two ways. First, I estimate the
model using recent methodological advances, such as approximate optimal instruments, see
Reynaert and Verboven (2014), and I carefully check the properties of the obtained minimum.
Second, the long time frame of the data (1998-2011) allows me to estimate the demand and
cost functions using only data from before the regulation (1998-2007). I then proceed by
testing how well the model is able to explain prices and quantities out of the estimation
sample in 2011 (the last year of my data). Due to the large di¤erence in fuel e¢ ciency
between 2007 and 2011 consumers face a di¤erent choice set in 2011 and this creates an
opportunity to test the ability of the model to explain prices and quantities in the new
choice set. I nd that the model is able to replicate sales weighted characteristics and prices
reasonably well, showing that consumer tastes are accurately identied.
Only after testing the ability of the estimated model to predict the observed response to
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the policy I proceed to evaluate the impact of di¤erent policy simulations. This is similar to
the approach taken by Todd and Wolpin (2006) and Kaboski and Townsend (2011). Also in
the industrial organization literature several market shocks such as mergers (Weinberg and
Hosken (2013)), sudden tax increases (Rojas (2008)), and the introduction of new products
(Hausman and Leonard (2002)) have been used to test commonly used estimation methods
and underlying assumptions.
In a third step I use the estimated model to simulate the incidence and total welfare
e¤ects of the regulation under di¤erent abatement strategies. I nd that if rms respond
by adding new technology consumer surplus increases by a total of $15 billion per year
relative to consumer surplus from the existing 2007 market. This is in sharp contrast with
the decrease in consumer surplus of $15 billion per year if the rms would have responded
with sales-mixing. The incidence of the regulation thus shifts completely to rms that have
to make xed costs to adopt the new technology. The reduction in greenhouse gas emissions
under technology adoption is limited, a decrease of 7%, because of an increase in total sales
relative to no policy sales in 2007. Total sales increase because of a rebound e¤ect on the
extensive margin: consumers decide to buy more vehicles. The increase in sales also increases
other externalities, such as accident risk and congestion. Overall, I estimate an upper bound
on the welfare e¤ects of the regulation e5 billion gains per year. This excludes the xed
cost of increased R&D to develop the necessary technology on which I have no data. If rms
had responded by shifting the relative prices of their products to adapt their sales mix the
overall e¤ect would be a yearly loss of e20 billion per year.
In a nal and fourth step, I look at the attribute-based design of the regulation. This
design, that lets the emission target vary with average weight of each producer, makes
sales-mix abatement much more costly for rms and thus increases the likelihood that rms
will increase their pace of technology adoption. In general, the di¤erence in welfare e¤ects
between sales-mix abatement and technology adoption show that policy makers should design
the regulation such that the latter strategy is chosen. Attribute-based regulation might be
one of the tools to achieve that, as well as providing a clear and long enough time path for
the abatement combined with heavy fees for breaking the standard. As Ito and Sallee (2014)
point out attribute-basing of a regulation has several potential other economic e¤ects such
as distortions in the market for the attribute and redistribution of compliance costs between
rms. Throughout the paper I will come back to these issues which reveal interesting insights
about the political economy in the design of the EU regulation.
Since the regulation induces investment in technology its e¤ect on social welfare depends
on possible market failures in the technology market. A rst source of market failures in
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technology adoption could be investment ine¢ ciencies of the consumer. If consumers dont
value future fuel cost savings to the full extent, rms will not be able to increase sales
after investments in fuel e¢ ciency. However, Grigolon, Reynaert and Verboven (2014) nd
that, using similar data, consumer investment ine¢ ciencies in the EU are not large.3 In the
structural model I also nd that consumers do respond to changes in fuel economy to such an
extent that this channel cannot explain why rms hardly invest in fuel e¢ ciency up until 2007.
A second channel might be market failures in technology adoption related to fuel e¢ ciency.
See Ja¤e, Newell and Stavins (2005) who discuss knowledge and adoption externalities and
incomplete information as market failures. These failures result in a socially suboptimal
equilibrium with none or too little investments.4 Emission standards might be one of the
instruments to move the whole industry out of this equilibrium. Testing the hypothesis of a
suboptimal equilibrium in fuel e¢ ciency investment would require data on the xed costs of
R&D related to fuel e¢ ciency and a dynamic model of technology investment. Recent work,
such as Hashmi and Van Biesebroeck (2012) and Aghion, Dechezleprêtre, Hemous, Martin
and Van Reenen (2012) , has looked at R&D patterns in the automobile industry through
patents. In sum, a possible explanation for the e¤ectiveness of the regulation may stem from
underinvestment in R&D by rms. However, detailed data on R&D expenses and xed costs
are typically not easily observable and a full analysis is out of scope for this paper.
Though the range and the detail of the data that I use in this paper are extensive, I
am not able to cover all possible e¤ects of the regulation. In the literature, there has been
considerable attention for the rebound e¤ect. If consumers buy more fuel e¢ cient vehicles,
the cost per kilometer of driving the vehicle goes down and the demand for vehicle miles
might increase. This further erodes the savings in greenhouse gas emissions as total vehicle
miles increase. Gillingham (2012) for example uses detailed micro-level data from California
to look at the interaction between the vehicle choice and the amount of driving. The data
also limit my focus to new vehicle sales. Jacobsen and van Benthem (2013) study the
e¤ect of emission standards on vehicle scrappage rates. They nd that e¢ ciency standards
increase vehicle lifetime. This further erodes predicted emission savings by 13-16%. The
e¤ect, also known as the Gruenspecht e¤ect, is a consequence of changes in relative prices
between new and second-hand vehicles. When rms respond to the policy with sales-mixing
new polluting vehicles become more expensive, which increases demand for older polluting
3Allcott and Wozny (2012) nd similar moderate undervaluation of future fuel savings for US consumers.
4It is perhaps striking that the industry itself agreed to step into a nonbinding agreement in 1998 but
failed to reach the targets. The voluntary agreement aimed to bring each producers sales weighted emissions
down to 140 g CO2/km by 2008. The agreement is considered a failure (only the small car makers Fiat, PSA
and Renault came close to the goal) and we see strong reductions in emissions only taking place after 2007.
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vehicles. My results might potentially reverse the predictions by Jacobsen and van Benthem
(2013) as new vehicles become more attractive in comparison to the existing eet, potentially
decreasing vehicle lifetime through a faster replacement rate. Further interesting research
opportunities thus exist on how the e¤ects of emission standards di¤er with alternative
abatement strategies.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the policy and the available data
in more detail. Section 3 presents emission standards in a model of supply and demand and
discusses the e¤ects of the di¤erent abatement strategies. Section 4 explains the changes in
the automobile market between 2007 and 2011 and shows the technological improvements in
fuel e¢ ciency. Section 5 presents estimation results and tests the out of sample performance
of the model. Section 6 presents the results of policy simulations and Section 7 concludes.
2 Background on the EU emission standard and data
2.1 The EU emission standard
The European regulation on emission standards for new passenger cars, Regulation (EC)
No. 443/2009 , sets a mandatory eet average of 130 grams CO2 per kilometer. The target
is set for each producers eet of new vehicle sales in a calendar year and trading of excess
emissions between producers is not allowed. The standard is an example of an attribute-
based regulation (ABR). An attribute-based regulation species a target that is correlated
with another characteristic of the product. Panel I in Figure 1 plots both a at and an
attribute-based target as a function of characteristic X. Products in B and C are under the
ABR and contribute to reduce sales weighted emissions, for the at standard products in
C and D contribute to compliance. For the EU regulation the emission target varies with
weight. The emissions of each vehicle are adjusted by the distance in weight wj from a
shifting point w0 (the pivotal weight point). The shifting point w0 is a mass of 1370 kg and
the di¤erence in weight from that point is multiplied by a = 0:046. For example, a vehicle
weighing 1370 kg, a standard hatchback, has a target of exactly 130 g CO2/km, the target
for an SUV weighting 1650 kg is 143 g/km, while a compact car of 1250 kg has a target of
124 g/km. The exact target for each producer is the following sales weighted average:P
jfleet qj(ej   a(wj   w0))P
jfleet qj
 130 (1)
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in which qj are sales in the EU in a given calendar year, a is the slope of the target function,
wj   w0 is the distance from the pivotal weight point and the sum is over all vehicles j a
producer sold.5
The regulation was proposed by the European Commission in 2007 and became a Eu-
ropean law in 2009. Deters (2010) gives an overview of the full legislative process and the
political background. The regulation will be fully binding in 2015 after a phase-in period of
several years starting in 2012. In 2012, 65% of manufacturers sales had to comply with the
emission standard. This rose to 75% in 2013, 80% in 2014 and the standard is fully binding
from 2015 onwards.
When producers exceed the standard they have to pay premiums for excess emissions.
The premium is e5 per unit sold for the rst excess g/km and increases to e95 per unit above
134 g/km. A manufacturer obtaining a sales weighted emission of 146 g/km, the average
in 2007 when the regulation was announced, would face a signicant penalty of e1280 per
vehicle (the average price of a vehicle in the sample is e22,250).6
The specics of the regulation were heavily debated during the drafting of the law. Several
newspaper reports discuss lobbying e¤orts by EU member states, rms and environmental
groups.7 France and Italy were strongly in favor of a at standard, while Germany wanted an
upward sloping target function in either weight or footprint (the rectangular area in between
the wheels of the vehicle). The German rms BMW, Daimler and Volkswagen on average
make heavier vehicles than Fiat (Italian), Renault and PSA (French). The production of
each of these rms mostly takes place within the boundaries of the home country and the
car sector is an important source for employment.
It is instructive to compare the EU policy with the US CAFE standard since this policy
has been the subject of several studies. The CAFE standard came into place in 1978 and
after a gradual phase-in has been constant at 27.5 mpg since 1990 (this corresponds to 198
g CO2/km). From 2009 onwards CAFE standards are tightened towards 36 mpg in 2016
(this corresponds to 152 g CO2/km). Contrary to the EU standard, light trucks (SUVs)
face a di¤erent less demanding target than passenger cars. Also, rms are allowed to trade
5Manufacturers can also obtain lower average emissions by gathering super credits. These credits are
given for vehicles that emit less than 50g/km. There are also seperate standards for small manufacturers
making less than 30 000 vehicles per year. Both of these exceptions are ignored in the analysis since they
count for a very small share of the total market.
6Contrary to the CAFE standards in the US there is no banking system for excess emissions over time.
The penalties in the EU are lower for low excess emissions but increase to higher levels than the penalties
for breaking the US CAFE standards.
7See for example "EU unveils tough emissions curbs for cars" - Financial Times, February 7 2007 and
"France battles Germany over car emissions" - Financial Times, November 15 2007.
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excess emissions over time and with other rms. This makes the CAFE standard a cap and
trade regulation while the EU standard is a simple cap per rm. From 2012 onwards the
CAFE standard also has an attribute-based part: the target varies with footprint. This is
described in more detail by Ito and Sallee (2014), who also give a detailed overview of the
fuel economy standard used in Japan. Japan is the only country in the world that has a
similar target as the EU in terms of emissions, but the Japanese market is unusual in the
sense that micro-cars (Kei cars) have a large market share.
2.2 Data
The main data set is obtained from a market research rm (JATO dynamics) and contains
a rich panel of the European car market. The data include sales and product characteristics
for each passenger car sold during 1998-2011 in seven European countries: Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Great Britain, The Netherlands and Spain. These markets represent around
90% of the total EU market.
Characteristics and sales are given for several engine variants of a car model. A model is
dened as a brand/model/body type combination (e.g., Volkswagen Golf Hatchback). The
engine variants di¤er in fuel type (gasoline or diesel) and engine performance. Accounting
for fuel type is important in the EU market as diesel variants have a considerable market
share (56% in 2011) and the CO2 emissions of diesel variants are lower; a diesel engine emits
about 20% less C02.8
Sales are dened as new vehicle registrations in each of the countries. Prices are sug-
gested retail prices (including registration taxes and VAT as obtained from the European
Automobile Association). The product characteristics included in the analysis are measures
of fuel e¢ ciency (liters per 100 km and CO2 emissions per km), vehicle size (footprint which
is dened as length by width, weight and height) and engine performance (horsepower and
displacement).9
The data on sales are supplemented with production data for each model. This data
comes from PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) and contains the country and plant of pro-
duction for each model. I match this data with a producer price index and a unit labor
cost measure obtained from the OECD. Finally, data on fuel prices (from DataStream),
8The combustion process and di¤erent energy content of the fuel make diesel engines more e¢ cient per
kilometer.
9CO2 emmisions and fuel consumption are obtained from the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC).
This is a standardized driving cycle to assess the emission levels of car engines. The cycle simulates both
urban and extra-urban driving patterns and excludes the use of auxiliary features like air conditioning. Real
world emissions thus di¤erentiate from these test values. I will come back to this point below.
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GDP/capita and number of households in each country (from Eurostat) are used to con-
struct fuel costs for consumers, real prices and the number of potential buyers in each year.
Throughout the paper, the full dataset is partitioned over time and markets in several
ways. To reduce the size of the data and complexity of the analysis, I leave out rms, brands
and models with very low sales. The analysis will focus on the largest producers and their
best selling brands on the EU market. The included rms are BMW, Daimler, Fiat, Ford,
General Motors, PSA, Renault and Volkswagen. I treat the largest Asian car makers as one
decision maker. This includes the rms Honda, Hyundai, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Suzuki and
Toyota. Jointly, the Asian rms are the 6th largest seller on the market and sell about the
same amount of vehicles as Fiat (the 7th largest producer). The list of included brands and
a detailed description of the model selection and data manipulations can be found in the
appendix. In total I keep 40,239 market/year/model/engine variants in 98 year/countries, or
about 400 model engine variants per market. The nal data contains 80% of total reported
sales in the sample.
In Section 4, I collapse the data towards a unique model engine variant in each year and
leave out the variation over markets. This data is used to make statements on the evolution
of the supply of engine characteristics over time and contains 12,659 unique observations.
To estimate the structural model I will rely only on data prior to the policy announcement
and use the years 1998-2007. This exploits 30,000 year/market/model-engine observations.
I will use the last year of data (2011) to test the validity of the structural model. Finally,
the data from year 2007 will be used as the benchmark for the simulations in Section 6.
2.3 Summary Statistics
Figure 2 plots sales weighted characteristics over time from 1998 to 2011 for both the EU
(Panel I) and the US (Panel II). Each characteristic is indexed in 1998. The most remarkable
trend in the EU is the evolution of sales weighted CO2 emissions. The level of emissions
is constant up until 2002, slightly declines about 6% until 2007, and then plunges by 14%
in the last four years of the sample. This shift coincides exactly with the announcement of
the fuel e¢ ciency standard by the European Commission. Historically, the 14% drop is a
large improvement in e¢ ciency over a short period of time. Klier and Linn (2012) show that
the most severe tightening of the US CAFE standards sparked an increase of 42% in fuel
e¢ ciency over an 8 year period (1975-1982). The US increase in fuel e¢ ciency was associated
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with a drop of more than 20% in horsepower and weight during the same period.10 This
is di¤erent in the EU, where horsepower and weight decrease somewhat between 2007 and
2009, but increase again to higher levels in 2011. Figure 2 clearly shows that engine power
and weight of passenger cars have been growing consistently over the sample period. By
2011, consumers choose a vehicle that on average is 23% more powerful and 13% heavier
than in 1998.
This increasing trend in vehicle size and performance is also apparent in the US market.
Panel II shows that horsepower increased by 34% and weight by 10%. Knittel (2011) also
documents these stark increases in characteristics of vehicles. Strikingly, the CO2 emissions
show a very di¤erent pattern in the US than in the EU. Until 2007 there is a very moderate
decline in emissions of about 3%. Between 2007 and 2009 emissions of newly produced
vehicles decline by 7% but then remain constant at 90% of the 1998 level. In the EU,
emissions further decrease in 2010 and 2011 and by the end of the sample are at 80% of the
1998 level.
Figure 3 plots each producers distance from the emission standard in 2007 and 2011.
Each rm needs to move below the dotted line which presents the emission standard. The
target function is up-sloping in weight because of the attribute-basing as explained above.
In 2007, each of the rms is far above the line and needs to decrease emissions in order to
comply. For rms in 2007 there are three options to reach the standard: reduce emissions,
increase weight or combine both. The Asian rms, BMW, Daimler and Ford decrease weight
and reduce emissions. Volkswagen reduces emissions keeping weight constant. Fiat, GM,
PSA and Renault all increase average weight slightly while decreasing emissions strongly.
A strong downward trend in emissions towards the standard is observed for all rms. The
decrease in emissions is so strong that most of the rms comply with the e¢ ciency standard
four years before it is fully binding.
Table 1 quanties this downward trend by showing the change in sales weighted vehicle
characteristics between 2007 and 2011. CO2 emissions decrease by 14% while there is mod-
erate growth in other sales weighted characteristics. Additionally, the table reports stark
decreases in fuel consumption for all size classes. Emissions decrease most in the luxury class
(20%) and in SUVs (25%). The lowest decrease is observed for subcompact cars (12%) and
compact vans (12%).
10The EPA keeps track of the evolution of quantity weighted characteristics for the US market. See:
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fetrends.htm
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3 Model
This section introduces the emission standard in a structural model of supply and demand.
I start by specifying a demand system for di¤erentiated products following Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (1995). Next, I model the regulation through the introduction of a shadow cost
in the prot function. Last, I discuss the di¤erent abatement strategies of rms and how
these strategies a¤ect quantities, costs and prices.
3.1 Demand, Prot and Marginal Cost
Demand There are M geographic markets, indexed by m = 1; : : : ;M , each market is
observed t times. I suppress the subscript t. In each market m there are Am potential
consumers. Consumers are assumed to purchase only in the market where they are located.
Each consumer i chooses one alternative j, which is either the outside good, j = 0, or one
of the J di¤erentiated products, j = 1; : : : ; J . Consumer is conditional indirect utility for
the outside good is ui0m = "i0m, and for products j = 1; : : : ; J it is:
uijm = xjm
x
i   eigjmejm   ipjm + jm + "ijm; (2)
where xjm is a vector of observed product characteristics, gjmejm are fuel costs (fuel prices gjm
times fuel consumption ejm), pjm is the vehicle price and jm is an unobserved characteristic
of vehicle j in market m, unobserved by the researcher but observed by consumers and
rms. The parameter vector (ei ; 
x
i ) consists of random coe¢ cients, capturing individual-
specic valuations for fuel costs and vehicle characteristics, i is the marginal utility of
income or price valuation and "ijm is a remaining individual-specic valuation for product
j (assumed to be i.i.d. type I extreme value). The random coe¢ cient for characteristic
k is given by ki = 
k + kki , where 
k
i is a random variable with zero mean and unit
variance, so that k represents the mean valuation for characteristic k and k is its standard
deviation across consumers. Indirect utility can be decomposed into the sum of three terms:
a mean utility term jm  xjmx   egjmejm   pjm + jm common to all consumers; an
individual-specic utility term jm(i) 
P
k x
k
jm
kki ; and an individual error term "ijt
specic to each product j. If k = 0 for all k, I obtain the standard logit model that
does not account for any consumer heterogeneity. Notice that the coe¢ cient on emissions
ei measures the response of consumers to shifts in fuel costs.
11 The mean parameter e
11There is a growing literature that tries to identify to what extent consumers take into account future
savings in fuel costs, see for example Allcott and Wozny (2012) and Grigolon, Reynaert and Verboven (2014).
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captures how much consumers care about fuel costs and thus emissions on average. I do not
separately allow consumers to care about the "green glow" of their vehicles, e captures the
private willingness to pay for fuel e¢ ciency. The taste parameter for fuel costs varies across
individuals. Reasons for individual heterogeneity in the taste for future fuel costs could be
heterogeneity in discounting, in the expectation of future costs or simply in mileage across
individuals.
Each consumer i in market m chooses the alternative j = 0; : : : ; J that maximizes her
utility. The predicted market share of vehicle j in market m is the probability that product
j yields the highest utility across all available products (including the outside good 0). This
is given by the logit choice probabilities, integrated over the individual-specic valuations
for the continuous characteristics:
sjm(m; ) =
Z
exp
 
jm + jm()

1 +
PJ
l=1 exp (lm + lm())
dP(); (3)
where m is the J  1 mean utility vector in market m (dependent on the mean valuation
parameters e; x and ), and  is the vector of standard deviations around the mean
valuations. To complete the demand side, I set the observed market share sjm = qjm=Am
equal to the predicted market share (3). In vector notation, the demand side in market m
can then be described by the market share system:
sm = sm(m; ): (4)
Prots Firms maximize prots by setting prices in all countries m for all of their products
j in their eet Ff . Price setting is assumed to happen independently in each market. Total
prot per year t is the sum of prots from each country m. I suppress the subscript t. The
emission standard is a constraint on the sales in all countries m in a given year t as set out
in (1):
max
p
X
m
[fm(p; e)] (5)
s:t:
P
m
P
jFf qjm(ejm   f(wjm))P
m
P
jFf qjm
 ;
in which  is the level of the standard and f(wj) is the attribute-basing on weight wj. The
constraint can be written as an implicit tax for vehicles that are less e¢ cient than the required
target and a subsidy for vehicles that are more e¢ cient. This closely follows Goldberg (1998)
and Jacobsen (2013) and is equivalent to writing the Lagrangian of the problem. Prots of
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rm f in year t are then given by:
f =
X
m
X
j2Ff
f[pjm   cjm(ej)  fLjm] sjm(p; e)Amg ; (6)
Ljm = [1  (   f(wjm))=ejm] (7)
in which cjm are marginal costs for product j in marketm, Ljm is the individual contribution
of each vehicle to the standard and f is the shadow cost of the regulation. The individual
contribution Ljm of each product is expressed as the distance between vehicle js emissions
(or fuel consumption) and the target emission . Because of the attribute-basing Ljm is a
function of weight wj through f(wj) which denes the slope of the target function. For a
at standard (not attribute-based) f(wj) = 0. The per vehicle shadow cost f gives the
cost of deviating one unit from the standard. If the standard is non-binding f = 0 and (6)
reduces to a standard multiproduct prot function. If the regulation is binding, f > 0 and
equals the shadow cost of compliance. The shadow cost f is rm specic because trading
of excess emission between rms is not allowed. Each rm has to comply with the standard
by adjusting their own vehicle eet, no matter how high the costs are compared to other
rms. The shadow cost takes the same value for each vehicle in the eet Ff of the rm. In
equilibrium, rms will equalize shadow costs over their vehicles to be cost e¢ cient.
To identify f Anderson and Sallee (2011) exploit loopholes in the CAFE standard, while
Jacobsen (2013) exploits the rst order conditions of constrained rms. Both approaches
exploit a panel where compliance with the CAFE standards is observed over several years.
In my analysis all of the data is from the period before the regulation such that f = 0. I
do observe rmsresponses and their abatement choices in the run up to the regulation but
I never observe a period where f > 0. Instead of estimating f I will exploit the structural
model and solve for values of f in simulations such that the regulation is exactly binding for
all rms. This means that in the simulations all rms have to meet the standard exactly. I do
not allow rms to pay nes or to do more than the standard requires. This is a simplication
compared to the framework of Jacobsen (2013) in which rms are allowed to deviate from
the standard. My goal however is not to estimate f (which would be impossible) but to
evaluate the welfare e¤ects of di¤erent abatement strategies. I will further discuss the role
of f in the simulations below.
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Marginal costs Marginal costs are assumed to be log-linear:
log(cjm) = 
eej + zjm
z + !jm; (8)
in which zjm is a 1 L vector of observed product characteristics, market controls and cost
shifters, !jm is the unobserved part of marginal costs. Emissions enter marginal cost as
all else equal it is more expensive to produce e¢ cient engines. This is conrmed in the
estimation (e < 0) and in several other engineering studies, see for example Whitefoot,
Fowlie and Skerlos (2013). Note that marginal costs are not directly observed in the data.
Marginal costs will be derived through the rst order conditions of the prot function.
Marginal cost parameters e and z will be estimated using data only from before the policy
announcement again exploiting the fact that in the majority of the data f = 0 and the
regulation has not been announced yet.
3.2 Abatement Strategies
The literature that empirically evaluates the e¤ects from fuel economy standards has focused
on two possible abatement strategies of producers: sales mixing and downsizing. The re-
sponse to the EU standard reveals a third possible strategy: technology adoption. Below, I
will show that technology adoption is fully responsible for the observed increase in fuel e¢ -
ciency in the EU. Here, I compare the possible e¤ects of each abatement strategy in detail
as well as the empirical challenges to evaluate the incidence of the regulation under each
strategy.12
Abatement by sales-mixing A rst mechanism to abate emissions, as modeled by Gold-
berg (1998) and Jacobsen (2013), is to change relative prices of high and low emission vehicles.
As shown in Figure 1, rms can decrease prices of vehicles in B and C (Ljm < 0) and increase
prices of vehicles in A and D (Ljm > 0) to shift market shares towards vehicles that comply
with the ABR. In order to comply with the at regulation the rm can decrease prices of
vehicles in C and D (L0jm < 0) and increase prices of vehicles in A and B (L
0
jm > 0). The set
of products available to each producer is assumed to be constant and that set is bounded by
the production possibility frontier given the current level of technology  . Since the product
set is assumed to be xed the only option that rms have is to change prices. Each rm
12The abatement strategies discussed do not need to happen mutually exclusive. Firms will choose their
abatement strategies such that the marginal abatement costs of each strategy is equal. When rms abate by
choosing only one strategy the marginal cost of that strategy must be lower than that of the other strategies.
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sets prices of all its products to maximize prots as given in (6). I assume a pure Nash
equilibrium in prices exists and write the rst-order conditions of (6) with respect to prices
as: 8<:sj(p; e) + X
k2Ff
@sk(p; e)
@pj
fpk   ck   fLk)g
9=; = 0 (9)
I denote the Nash equilibrium as p = p(e). If f = 0 the rst order conditions reduce to
the well known rst order conditions of a Nash Bertrand game in prices for a multi-product
rm. When f > 0 the e¢ ciency standard is binding. The relative prices of products with
di¤erent emissions will change as rms take into account the contribution of each vehicle to
attain the standard. If a vehicle is more polluting than the target, Ljm > 0 and the rm will
perceive this vehicle as having a higher cost and increase its price. The opposite is true for a
fuel e¢ cient vehicle that helps to comply with the standard. The change in relative prices of
products will shift sales towards more fuel e¢ cient vehicles resulting in a di¤erent sales-mix.
The incidence and e¤ectiveness of this abatement strategy largely depends on the respon-
siveness of consumers to price changes and their tastes for characteristics that correlate with
fuel e¢ ciency. Prices of some products will increase while others will decrease. Jacobsen
(2013) shows that the sales-mix response will be very costly for consumers and rms because
of the strong tastes for powerful and large vehicles. My simulations conrm these ndings.
The e¤ects on rmsprots will depend largely on the share of the eet that is under the
target. Firms with a eet that is better adapted to the standard might increase prots.
Their prices will need less distortion compared to other rms and so they might steal sales.
The empirical model will allow me to identify own and cross price elasticities for all products
and to simulate the shifts in sales from the regulation by solving for the Nash equilibrium
through the rst order conditions.
Abatement by technology adoption Firms can improve fuel e¢ ciency of existing vehi-
cles by adapting engines, the combustion process or features that only a¤ect fuel e¢ ciency.13
The e¤ects on equilibrium of technology adoption are very di¤erent than those of sales-mix
abatement or downsizing. Consider a technology shift over time from  to e that shifts
13Knittel (2011) gives several examples of specic technologies that are implemented. The In-
ternational Energy Agency reported a possible 40% improvement in fuel e¢ ciency from avail-
able technologies in 2005. These include low rolling resistance of tires, reduced drive-
line friction, combustion improvements, thermal management, variable valve actuation and lift,
auxiliary systems improvement, thermodynamic cycle improvements and dual clutch transmis-
sion. See http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/technology-roadmap-fuel-economy-
of-road-vehicles.html.
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emissions such that ejm1() > ejm2(e) for each vehicle. In Figure 1 this shift is shown in
Panel II and increases the range of possible vehicles under the target lines for both the at
standard and the ABR. A shift in emissions through technology adoption will have various
e¤ects on the equilibrium outcome. A rst e¤ect is a change in marginal costs as dened in
(8) as it is more expensive to make fuel e¢ cient vehicles. A second e¤ect is that technology
adoption leads to a reduction in the marginal cost of the regulation: f shrinks when set
of vehicles under the target line (Ljm < 0) increases. This means that by increasing tech-
nology rms require less and less changes in relative prices in order to comply. Eventually,
for strong shifts in  , the rm can choose its preferred price scheme once f = 0. A third
e¤ect of technology improvement is changes in demand as consumers face a choice set with
new product characteristics. The savings in fuel expenses might lead consumers to buy more
cars or more expensive vehicles containing more of other characteristics depending on their
tastes. A fourth and nal e¤ect is that rms will reach a new Nash equilibrium in prices,
from p(e( 1)) to p(e( 2)). There are two sources of upward pressure on prices. Increases
in marginal costs and limited pass-through of decreases in fuel costs to consumers. The
degree to which prices change depends largely on the elasticity of consumers with respect
to fuel costs and prices and the degree of competition in the market. I will assume that
both the xed cost of developing the technology as well as the adoption of the technology
(changing production lines) are considered to be sunk costs and thus will not impact the
equilibrium prices.
The total e¤ect of technology adoption is an empirical question. On the one hand,
prots might increase because of higher demand for vehicles. On the other hand, prots
might decrease because of rising costs. The e¤ect on consumer surplus is also uncertain
as buyers trade-o¤ lower fuel costs with higher prices. The empirical model will allow me
to simulate and validate the increases in prices, changes in quantities and the e¤ects on
consumer surplus and rm prots from technology adoption.
Abatement by downsizing Both Klier and Linn (2012) and Whitefoot, Fowlie and Sker-
los (2013) show that in the medium run rms can abate emissions by changing the charac-
teristics of their vehicle eet. Typically vehicles with less horsepower and weight will have
lower emissions and therefore designing more fuel e¢ cient cars requires downsizing if the
level of technology remains xed. When choosing to downsize rms thus extend their vehicle
eet Ff with newly designed products that have more fuel e¢ ciency but less of other charac-
teristics. In Figure 1 rms abate by downsizing if they design new vehicles in B and C given
the current level of technology  in order to comply with the ABR (for the at standard
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vehicles in C and D are designed).14 The set of vehicles that have Ljm > 0 increases and this
mitigates the need of changing relative pricing as more vehicles comply with the standard.
Both Klier and Linn (2012) and Whitefoot et al. (2013) simulate that this strategy would be
used to a considerable amount if the CAFE standards were to be tightened. Downsizing the
eet would have to be combined with sales-mixing but might be responsible for up to 80%
of the abatement. Klier and Linn (2012) compare the welfare e¤ects of a one mile per gallon
increase in the CAFE standard attained by full sales mixing with the e¤ects of rms com-
bining downsizing and sales mixing. They nd that compliance costs for rms decrease by
about 40% from $9 billion per year to $5.6 billion per year. The incidence of the regulation
on consumers remains similar as they still end up buying smaller vehicles while consumers
have a strong taste for horsepower, weight and other characteristics. In fact, consumer losses
from the regulation increase in their simulations.
Empirically modeling downsizing is challenging for three reasons. First, one needs a
realistic model of how rms choose product designs that are technically possible. Klier and
Linn (2012) exploit observed relations between product characteristics and Whitefoot et al.
(2013) use an engineering model. Second, the model needs to allow rms to make strategic
decisions on both prices and product characteristics, which complicates solving the Nash
equilibrium. Third, one needs to account for the fact that these design decisions will be
correlated with unobservables such that instruments are needed to identify consumer tastes
for endogenous characteristics.15 A full model of endogenous product choices is out of the
scope of this paper. The available data do not reveal signicant downsizing by rms and
thus not allow me to validate a model that endogenizes product characteristics. This would
require panel data in which we observe rms that are constrained by the regulation over
a longer period. I focus instead on rms initial move towards the EU regulation which is
characterized by technology adoption.
Flat and attribute-based standards In the analysis I consider two designs of the reg-
ulation Ljm. First, I exactly replicate the EU policy. This results in a per vehicle burden
14The incentive to literally downsize in terms of weight clearly diminishes when the ABR slope increases.
Whitefoot and Skerlos (2012) discuss the possible increases in footprint because of attribute-basing in the
US regulation.
15Also Fan (2013) endogenized product characteristics to explain the e¤ects of mergers on the quality
of newspapers. Her work provides a clear discussion of the type of variation and equilibrium assumptions
that are needed to endogenize the choice of product characteristics. I experimented with several sources of
variation in this dataset (such as the di¤erent degree of globalization and the specic production set up (as
in Klier and Linn (2012)) but no source of variation provided strong enough instruments to reliably estimate
this kind of model.
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of Ljm = [1  (   f(wjm))=ejm], in which =130g CO2/km and f(wjm) = a(w0   wjm) as
specied in (1) and plotted in Figure 3. Second, I specify a at standard so that in equilib-
rium the same sales weighted emission are attained. For the at standard L0jm = [1  0=ejm]
and there is no correlation between the target of the standard and weight f(wjm) = 0. The
target function is a horizontal line at 0 in this case and all rms need to reach exactly the
same level of CO2 emissions.
Both the shadow costs and the level of technology needed to comply with the regulation
will di¤er between the at standard and the attribute-based standard as a di¤erent set of
vehicles has Ljm < 0 than L0jm < 0. This can be seen clearly in Figure 1: vehicles in B and
C have Ljm < 0 and comply with the ABR, while vehicles in C and D have L0jm < 0 and
comply with the at regulation. Depending on the average weight of each rm f will thus
be di¤erent than 0f . The attribute-based regulation shifts the distribution of costs between
rms as well as the costs related to the di¤erent abatement strategies. In further research it
would be interesting to compare the incentives towards downsizing and technology adoption
that come from the ABR.
The attribute-based regulation might have other economic consequences. Ito and Sallee
(2014) point out that attribute-based standards create a distortion in the demand and supply
of the attribute itself. If heavier cars help with attaining the target, weight is indirectly
subsidized and producers will choose to add more weight to their vehicles. This creates
distortions, which might be signicant if weight is associated with other external costs. See
for example the analysis by Anderson and Au¤hammer (2014) who relate weight to accident
risk. In this exercise I will keep weight, and other characteristics, constant to focus on
the primary e¤ect of the regulation: the signicant increase in e¢ ciency. Ito and Sallee
(2014) also show that attribute-basing might increase the cost e¢ ciency of the regulation by
equalizing abatement costs. If producers of heavier vehicles nd it more di¢ cult to abate
emissions a slope in the target function can equalize the marginal cost of compliance across
rms. In this sense attribute-basing can be a replacement for emission trading between
rms which would fully equalize abatement costs. In the case of emission trading producers
of heavy vehicles would be willing to pay producers of lighter vehicles to do more of the
abatement. In the simulations I will discuss the possible e¤ects of attribute-basing in detail.
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4 Market Response to the EU Emission Standard
In this section I decompose the observed 14% decrease in emissions. How much of this drop
is attributable to sales-mixing, technology adoption or downsizing? To answer this question
I will estimate isocost functions in emissions and other vehicle characteristics using a reduced
form equation. The results will reveal that the drop in emissions between 2007 and 2011 is
fully attributable to technology adoption. In the next sections I will then use this result to
estimate and validate a structural model in order to compare the welfare e¤ects of technology
adoption with those of sales-mixing.
I explain the causes for the decrease in sales weighted emissions between 2007 and 2011
following the approach of Knittel (2011) and estimate the technological progress in fuel e¢ -
ciency and the trade-o¤between product characteristics xjt and emissions ejt. The estimated
relations between xjt and ejt are depicted as production possibility frontiers in Figure 1 Panel
II. I use the estimated relations to decompose the observed gains in e¢ ciency into a part
due to changes in relative prices, a part due to downsizing and a part due to technological
advances. Intuitively, sales mixing and downsizing would reveal changes in sales weighted
emission without shifts in the production possibility frontier. It is important to note that
this exercise will use a di¤erent dimension of the data than the structural model. In this
section I collapse the dataset to each version of a vehicle that I observe and leave out all
variation over markets (I am not interested in explaining prices and quantities at this stage).
Notation in this section therefore is a vehicle j observed in the data at some time t (the
market m is redundant here).
Estimation of trade-o¤ and technology parameters Following Knittel (2011), Klier
and Linn (2012) and Klier and Linn (2013) I estimate the following regression:
log(ejt) =  t +  log(xjt) + jt; (10)
in which the technology parameter  t is a time xed e¤ect, the trade-o¤parameters  denote
how emissions ejt change due to a 1% change in a characteristic xjt and jt is an error term.
The technology parameter captures shifts over time in the trade-o¤ between emissions and
characteristic and captures engine improvements such as better thermal management and
improved valve timing. Graphically  t captures shifts in the production possibility frontier
(as shown in Figure 1) and  gives the slope of the frontier. The trade-o¤ parameters  are
assumed to be constant over time, such that technology  t can be seen as input neutral (it
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enters multiplicative in levels). I assume jt to be i.i.d. and estimate (10) by ordinary least
squares. I will discuss several concerns regarding identication below.
Table 2 presents the trade-o¤ parameters  from estimating (10). Model 1 is the baseline
specication, close to that of Knittel (2011), and includes trade-o¤ parameters for horse-
power, weight, footprint and height. For Model 1 I nd that a 10% increase in horsepower
causes a 1.8% increase in emissions. A 10% increase in weight and height increases emissions
by 6.6% and 4.1%, while increasing the footprint reduces emissions by 1.6% (not precisely es-
timated). A diesel engine is about 20% more e¢ cient than a gasoline engine which coincides
with engineering numbers. These numbers have the same sign and a similar magnitude as
those reported by Knittel (2011) and are almost identical to Klier and Linn (2013) who use
similar European data. Before presenting the technology parameters, I estimate six other
specications that address a number of issues. Model 2 includes diesel by characteristics
interactions and thus allows a di¤erent functional form for diesel engines (instead of only
a di¤erent dummy). Model 3 and Model 4 address possible biases related to technology
expenditures. If unobserved expenditures on technology are correlated with characteristics
on the right hand side of (10) this would bias the estimated parameters. Expenditures on
technology are likely reected in marginal costs so to control for expenditures, I add prices
and marginal costs as explanatory variables.16 If biases from unobserved expenditure would
be substantial I would expect parameters to change between Model 1 and Model 3 or 4,
which they do not. Model 5 estimates (10) with frequency weights for sales. If rms would
increase technology only in specic groups of low or high selling vehicles the parameters in
Model 1 will be biased. Again, the trade-o¤ parameters are similar between Model 5 and
Model 1. Model 6 allows the trade-o¤ parameters to change over time (the functional form
changes year by year), and Model 7 allows for a rm specic trend in technology. These
last two models should result in di¤erent predictions for the technology parameters if the
technology is not input neutral or is di¤erent between rms.
The technology parameters  t are derived from the time xed e¤ects in each regression
and plotted in Table 3 for Model 1-Model 6, results for each of the rms from model 7 are
in the appendix.17 Technology improves over time between 1998 and 2007 by an average
16Marginal costs are unobserved so I use the predicted marginal costs from the structural model.
17The time dummies capture shifts in how vehicle characteristics (horsepower, weight, size and height)
translate into emissions. Two concerns are that apart from technological improvements these shifts could
capture shifts in other unobserved characteristics or changes in how the value of emissions is obtained. To
test wether other unobserved characteristics have changed I ran the regression (not reported) on parts of
the data for which I additionaly observe cylinder and acceleration. Controling for this does not change the
results. The emission values in the data are o¢ cial measures stemming from the New European Driving
Cycle, a standardized test that did not change during the sample period. One valid concern is that rms over
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pace of between 0.7% and 1.6% over the di¤erent specications. After 2007 the estimates
reveal a signicant increase in the pace of technology improvement with a yearly average
increase of more than 4% for all models. The rm specic technology paths reveal similar
increases in technological e¤ort after 2007 for each rm. These ndings provide strong
suggestive evidence that rms speed up the adoption of technology in the period after the
policy announcement in order to comply with the regulation. The move towards the policy
target in Figure 3 is so clear that the policy announcement seems to be the primary candidate
to explain the speed-up in technology adoption after 2007. Klier and Linn (2013) estimate
the technology path for both the US and the EU and try to establish a causal impact of the
policy, they nd that tighter standards indeed lead to more technology adoption.
Decomposition of the changes in fuel e¢ ciency The estimated relation (10) can be
used to reveal the compliance strategy of rms between 2007 and 2011 and this is shown
in Table 4. I dene emissions ejt to have constant technology  t =  2007. This means
that any changes in the sales weighted values of ejt are caused by either changes in vehicle
characteristics or changes in the market shares of more fuel e¢ cient vehicles. Sales-mixing
changes the sales weighted values of ejt for existing vehicle models that are released before
the policy announcement (prior to 2007). Downsizing would reveal itself by values of ejt that
are on average smaller for vehicles released after the policy announcement. An example of a
newly released model is the "Citroen DS3 Hatchback", released in 2009. Note that I do not
treat new engine versions as new models as these directly capture the new technology. Next,
I predict emissions, bejt, using both the trade-o¤ parameters and the technology estimates.
This corresponds to the tted values of regression (10). The trend in bejt gives the sum of
sales-mix abatement, downsizing and technology adoption. I re-scale each of the predicted
emissions with the attribute-based target function, such that the numbers can be read as
actual distances from the regulation.18
The results in Table 4 reveal several interesting trends. Between 1998 and 2007 sales
weighted emissions without technology increased slightly from 151 to 154 (an increase of
2%). Technology improvements were fully responsible for the observed moderate decline
in emissions between 1998 and 2007. After 2007, the sales weighted emissions without
technology ejt keep increasing gradually from 154 to 155. There is thus no evidence of
signicant changes that could be attributable to either sales-mixing or downsizing. On the
time are getting better at taking the test, such that real-world emissions deviate more from tested emissions.
This might cause the reported technology estimates to be overstated.
18The results without this correction lead to exactly the same conclusions.
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contrary sales weighted emission ejt increase slightly between 2007 and 2011. When I split up
the sales weighted emissions into vehicle models released after and prior to 2007 the results
show that the sales weighted emission of vehicles released prior to 2007 remain constant (154
in 2007 and 154 in 2011). This means that market shares of vehicles with di¤erent emissions
have remained constant and relative prices have not changed. New vehicles, on average,
surprisingly have higher sales weighted emissions than the existing vehicle eet. There is
thus no evidence of downsizing: vehicle models released after the policy announcement are on
average more polluting than existing vehicle models. The di¤erence between existing vehicles
and vehicles released after the policy decreases over time however. This shows that the policy
might also inuence the growth rate of characteristics over the longer term. However, the
observed decline in emissions is thus not in any sense attributable to changes in the sales
mix or to the release of new downsized fuel e¢ cient vehicles.
The sales weighted emissions with technology bejt are decreasing rapidly after 2007 and
this shows that technology adoption is fully responsible for the observed drop in emissions.
Strikingly, the decrease in sales weighted emissions of older vehicles due to technology is as
strong as the decrease in newly released vehicles. This shows that the engine improvements
are installed widely across the eet. The degree of technology adoption is that high between
2007-2011 that rms, once the regulation is binding, will not have to change relative prices
or downsize their vehicles. Because of the increase in technology adoption most rms already
comply with the emission standard in 2011 as is shown in Figure 3. This nding is in contrast
with the US literature discussing the compliance strategies to the CAFE standard. In the
case of the European emission standard abatement by technology adoption is not a possible
long term response but is observed immediately after the policy announcement and in such
amounts that other abatement strategies are not needed for further compliance. Below, I
will try to explain why this abatement strategy is chosen and why this matters in order to
evaluate the welfare e¤ects of the regulation.
5 Estimation
In this section I estimate a structural model of demand and supply of the automobile market
as set out in Section 3. The model allows me to make statements on the welfare e¤ects of the
regulation, as well as to compare the e¤ects of technology adoption with those of alternative
abatement strategies. The structural model will rely on heavy functional form assumptions.
In order to test the validity of those assumptions, I will explicitly test the ability of the
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model to predict prices and market shares after the policy announcement. This out of
sampletesting is important as it will show to what extent the model is able to explain the
observed changes before making welfare statements from simulated changes. In this section
I make use of the full panel structure of my data and include variation over countries and
time.
5.1 Estimation of demand and marginal cost function (using data
from before policy announcement)
I have a panel of 70 markets, to estimate the taste and marginal cost parameters as de-
ned in Section 3. The sample is restricted to markets that are observed before the policy
announcement and contains the data for 7 countries in the period 1998-2007. This allows
me to estimate a model in which rms choose prices to maximize unconstrained prots as
given in (6) with  = 0. The vector of parameters  to be estimated consists of the taste
parameters ei ; 
x
i and i and the cost parameters 
e and x. I estimate both a mean and
a standard deviation of the taste for fuel consumption, horsepower, weight, footprint and a
dummy for foreign perceived cars (e.g. a BMW in France). I specify i to be proportional to
income ymt in market mt, so i = =ymt. A set of controls is added for which I only estimate
the mean taste. These include height, brand xed e¤ects, market xed e¤ects, diesel by
market interactions, body type dummies, size class dummies, a dummy for 3 doors, months
on market dummies (for vehicles introduced within a calendar year), and a time trend. The
remaining unexplained variation in market shares is jmt. Marginal costs are explained by
the same set of variables, except that fuel e¢ ciency enters instead of fuel consumption, the
diesel market interactions are dropped (as these capture tax di¤erences for consumers), a
full set of year dummies is added and labor costs and a production in the country of sales
dummy are added. This captures transportation and distribution costs. The remaining part
of marginal costs !jmt is unobserved.
The parameters are obtained by minimizing the GMM criterion:
min

 ()0 g(z)0A ()0 g(z)0 (11)
in which jmt = (jmt; !jmt) the matrix of demand and supply unobservables stacked over
all markets, g(z) is the matrix of instruments and A is a weighting matrix. I follow the
estimation algorithm described in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and Nevo (2001). I
take into account recent cautionary warnings and improvements and carefully check the
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properties of the obtained minimum.19 For simplicity, I estimate the demand and supply
separately and do not exploit cross equation restrictions on the price parameter. I instrument
for prices using the production data that gives me the location and plant of production for
every vehicle. I add sums of characteristics per size class for each vehicle as additional
price instruments. A third group of instruments identies the nonlinear parameters through
approximations of the optimal instruments following the approach described in Reynaert and
Verboven (2014). I estimate marginal costs under the assumption of perfect and imperfect
competition. Perfect competition serves as a benchmark since price equals marginal costs
estimation is an ols of prices on cost shifters. With the assumption of imperfect competition,
marginal costs are the solution of the system of rst order conditions as given in (9). As
a benchmark I also present the results from a simpler logit model, ignoring all individual
heterogeneity.
Table 5 presents the estimated parameters and standard errors. The demand parameters
for both the logit and RC logit show that consumers dislike higher prices, higher fuel costs
and foreign cars. Consumers have positive tastes for weight and footprint. In the RC logit,
the standard deviation for both fuel costs and horsepower is estimated to be signicant.
On average consumers dislike fuel costs but some consumers nd this more important than
others. Grigolon, Reynaert and Verboven (2014) discuss this heterogeneity, related to di¤er-
ences in mileage among consumers, in more detail. The taste heterogeneity for horsepower
is very strong and it causes the mean parameter to shift sign between the logit and RC logit
specication. Other standard deviations on weight, footprint and foreign are found to be
small or imprecisely estimated.
The marginal cost estimates under perfect competition in Table 5 are identical for both
the logit and RC logit, it is simply a linear regression of prices on cost shifters. These
estimates are useful though as they show that both cost instruments obtained from the pro-
duction data are signicant and have the expected sign. Increases in labor cost increase
marginal costs and production in the local market decreases costs. All marginal cost regres-
sions show that increasing the fuel e¢ ciency of the vehicle is costly. A one unit decrease in
the liters per 100km increases cost with 2.5% to 8.7% over the di¤erent specications. All
19More specically I do the following: (i) I use a nested-xed point (NFP) algorithm, BLPs contaction
mapping with a very thight convergence criterion (1e-12) to solve for jmt, (ii) I re-estimate the model with
10 di¤erent starting values for the non linear parameters, (iii) I check rst and second order conditions at the
obtained minimum, (iv) I use the Interior/Direct algorithm in Knitro. I use a NFP because Mathematical
Programming under Equilibrium Constraints proved to be slower in this application once I parralized the
computation of the contraction mapping. As is shown in Reynaert and Verboven (2014) both estimation
algorithms should give the same results.
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characteristics also have the expected sign. Adding horsepower, weight, footprint or height,
makes vehicles more costly.
I conclude this section by emphasizing that emissions enter the model through two chan-
nels. First, all else equal, consumers dislike vehicles that have higher emissions because they
are more costly. There is considerable and signicant variation in the degree consumers
dislike fuel costs. Second, building vehicles that are more e¢ cient and have lower CO2 emis-
sions is costly for manufacturers. Both of these parameters will be of importance in the
simulations.
5.2 Out of sample performance of the structural model
Before proceeding to the simulations and welfare results it is important to asses the ability
of the structural model to predict counterfactual outcomes. In recent years there have been
questions regarding the reliability and usefulness of structural estimation in general. Angrist
and Pischke (2010) for example state that many of the new industrial organization stud-
ies forecast counterfactual outcomes without showing that the simulations deliver accurate
predictions. The RC logit demand model in particular has been criticized by Knittel and
Metaxoglou (2014). They show that results might change signicantly depending on the
optimization algorithm used.
As I observe the abatement strategy chosen by the rms in response to the policy, I will
test the ability of the estimated model to predict the observed market outcomes after the
technology adoption. This exercise provides a test of the predictive power of the structural
estimates and thereby tries to address the recent critiques. This is di¤erent from most of
the literature as it requires both before and after policy intervention data, though there are
some important papers that do a similar exercise. For example, Todd and Wolpin (2006)
and Kaboski and Townsend (2011) evaluate the impact of di¤erent policies after rst testing
the ability of the estimated model to predict the observed response to the policy. Also,
in the industrial organization literature several market shocks such as mergers (Weinberg
and Hosken (2013)), stark sudden tax increases (Rojas (2008)), and the introduction of new
products (Hausman and Leonard (2002)) have been used to test the predictive power of
commonly used estimation methods.
In Section 5.1. I estimated demand and marginal cost parameters using 10 years of
data from 1998-2007 before the policy announcement. Because of the technology adoption,
consumers face a di¤erent choice set in 2011 than in 2007, with vehicles being on average
14% more fuel e¢ cient. Firms will also face a di¤erent pricing decision as marginal costs
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have changed and competing products have di¤erent fuel e¢ ciency. This large shift in one
of the characteristics of the vehicles provides me with the opportunity to test the t of
the estimated model to the new choice set. If taste and cost parameters remain constant
over time and are estimated precisely a correctly specied model should be able to explain
observed sales and prices of vehicles with a signicantly higher fuel e¢ ciency in 2011.
The procedure for the out of sample test is straightforward. First, I make the assumption
that both the supply !jmt and demand error jmt in equation (8) and (3) are at their expected
level (E(!jm2011) = E(jm2011) = 0). Intuitively this means that I only rely on predictive
power from the observables and ignore all information about the unobservable.20 Second, I
predict the marginal costs bcjt for each vehicle on sale in 2011 using the estimated parameters
from Table 5. I estimated marginal cost parameters using only data from 1998-2007, so
this is a rst out of sample prediction. Given the predicted marginal costs bcjm2011 I solve for
prices. Under the assumption of perfect competition this is done by setting bpjm2011 = bcjm2011.
When assuming imperfect competition I solve the system of nonlinear equations given by the
rst order conditions (9). Because the regulation is still not binding in 2011 and rms do not
change their sales mix I solve for the unconstrained price equilibrium and set the shadow cost
of the regulation  = 0. Given prices bpjm2011 and marginal costs bcjm2011 I solve for quantities
by integrating over each of the simulated logit probabilities. Table 6 summarizes the sales
weighted characteristics over all countries in 2007 and 2011 for each of the four estimated
models. I focus on sales weighted characteristics instead of individual vehicle sales and prices
for two reasons. First, from a policy perspective I am not interested in which specic cars
get sold the most but in the overall emission level of the vehicle eet. Second, the data is
very disaggregated on a version level (similar vehicles with almost the same characteristics
but very di¤erent sales). This means I expect large variability in the demand unobservable.
I come back to this point below.
The rst panel of Table 6 gives the results for the within sample t of the model. Prices
and quantities are predicted by setting !jm2007 = jm2007 = 0. This shows the cost of setting
the unobservables equal to zero without changes in characteristics out of the sample. All
predicted sales weighted characteristics are within a 5% error margin of the observed sales
weighted characteristics. All four of the models generate similar predictions though the RC
logit is closer to all the observed characteristics except for the percentage of diesel vehicles
sold.
The second panel of Table 6 gives the results for the out of sample t. The model is able
20Sampling k times from the distributions b!jmt, bjmt and averaging over the k simulations takes into
account the estimated distribution of the error terms but made almost no di¤erence in practice.
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to predict most of the decrease in sales weighted characteristics. CO2 emissions are predicted
to be 130 g/km from the logit and 129 g/km from the RC logit estimates, while observed
emissions decreased from 147 g/km to 126 g/km. This means sales weighted emissions di¤er
by only 2.3% from observed emissions, while there was an actual drop of 14%. Also weight,
footprint and the share of diesel are very close to the observed 2011 levels. The prediction of
both the sales weighted level of horsepower and prices has an error margin of 6.2% and 7.2%.
The error is not attributable to a bias in predicted prices (the actual bias is almost zero for
predicted prices), but it comes from the estimation of the market shares of more expensive
higher horsepower vehicles. In general though, these numbers show that the out of sample
t is good and that the model is able to predict market quantities of interest despite a large
change in one of the characteristics. When we compare the four di¤erent estimation models
it is again the RC logit model with imperfect competition that is closest to the observed
values. This will be the preferred model I will use throughout the simulations.
To end this section I give a few cautionary remarks and thoughts for further research.
First, the out of sample test provides a validation of the demand model but not of the as-
sumptions regarding price competition. I nd that both the cost functions under perfect
and imperfect competition are able to predict prices accurately after the product character-
istics change. However, this does not provide any information as to what extent the divide
between markups and costs is realistic. There is no large structural break in the data that
gives me the necessary variation in markups and prices to test several competitive models
against each other (see Rojas (2008)).
Next, the fact that sales of high priced and high horsepower vehicles are estimated too
high might have two reasons. First, if measured fuel e¢ ciency gains from the test cycle
do not fully translate into reduced fuel costs, the model will overpredict the obtained fuel
savings and the shares of high price and performance vehicles. Second, between 2007 and
2011 the price of SUVs dropped by 20% as less luxurious models with similar observables
entered the market. This shows the inherently static features of the estimation method as
the mean quality of an SUV is not assumed to change over time. Despite these dynamic
changes in the market, and the entrance of new and redesigned models the static model
actually provides a surprisingly good t over a four year period of changes.
Another remark is related to the role of the outside good and the total size of the car
market. The model is not able to predict the decrease in total sales in the European market
observed between 2007 and 2011. I use (in line with previous research) the number of
households as a scale for the total possible market. The number of households between 2007
and 2011 did not change while the total number of sales decreased by 20% because of the
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2008 crisis. The model is thus not able to predict large macro-economic trends. This is
relevant for the counterfactual analysis as all simulations are made under the assumption
that there will be no changes in the overall demand for vehicles except for those related to
the policy intervention.
A last point of caution is related to the modelsability to predict individual sales and
prices of vehicles. Prices are estimated precisely while market shares are estimated less
precisely. The variance of the demand error is much higher than that of the supply error.
In other words, observables are su¢ cient to make precise predictions of prices but not of
quantities. This is partly due to the very disaggregated level of the data with many vehicles
similar in observables except sales. The model is able to capture the taste for characteristics
precisely and thus correctly estimates the total share of similar vehicles but not their indi-
vidual share. This issue raises concerns when one is interested in predicting the e¤ects of
smaller market interventions (such as the introduction of a new vehicle for example). For this
project it is su¢ cient to see that the model is able to predict changes in aggregate outcomes
in fuel e¢ ciency and other characteristics.
6 Welfare e¤ects of alternative abatement strategies
In this section I use the structural model to compare the welfare e¤ects of sales-mix abate-
ment and abatement by technology adoption. The structural model allows me to simulate
the incidence of the regulation under the di¤erent abatement strategies. Previous literature
has already shown that the burden of the regulation falls heavily on both consumers and
rms when relative prices change in order to abate emissions or when rms choose to down-
size. The impact of the regulation when rms respond with technology adoption has not
been studied and is an empirical question as consumers will trade-o¤ higher prices against
lower fuel costs. I will start this section by presenting the set-up of the simulation. Second,
I will show how the aggregate sales and the distribution of sales changes in response to a
standard. This will establish intuition on the e¤ects of standards on the composition of
sales. Third, I will show how the impact of the regulation di¤ers with the chosen abatement
strategy. Fourth, I will look at the distributional e¤ects of the standard between the major
European car producers and how these e¤ects relate to the design of the regulation. Finally,
I will discuss why the regulation might solve a market failure in technology adoption by
rms.
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Simulation set-up I will run four di¤erent policy simulations. In the rst two scenarios
I simulate a policy exactly equal to the EU emission standard and let rms respond either
by sales-mix abatement or by technology adoption (the observed response). In the last two
scenarios, I also consider the e¤ects of a at standard with both abatement strategies. All
the policy simulations will be identical in the nal obtained sales weighted CO2 emissions.
I use the observed vehicle characteristics from the year 2007 and the estimated coe¢ cients
of the RC Logit model with imperfect competition from Table 5. I let the emissions of
all vehicles decrease by 6.4%, which corresponds to the estimated trend in technology from
Table 3 for four years. All other product characteristics remain at their 2007 levels and
I do not account for new vehicle entries. This is an approximation of what the car eet
would have looked like in 2011 without a policy intervention. In Figure 4, I plot each of
the vehicles in an emission/weight diagram. The diagonal line is the target function for the
attribute-based standard while the horizontal line is the target with a at standard. All
dots underneath the policy lines contribute to the standard, this is a di¤erent set for the
horizontal target than for the up-sloping target. The vehicle eet after technology adoption
towards the attribute-based standard is depicted in Figure 4, Panel II. Figure 4, Panel III
presents the vehicle eet after technology adoption towards the at target function.
In each of the simulations I have to solve for a set of unknowns that will equate each of
the rmsemissions with the standards.21 Under abatement by sales mixing the unknown
is the shadow cost f , while under technology adoption I have to solve for the level of fuel
e¢ ciency required for each rm to attain the standard. Solving for the necessary shadow
costs, technology and resulting prices and quantities in each of the scenarios is done by
following a step-wise algorithm. This algorithm is described in the appendix. Note that the
regulation is binding over the sum of geographical markets. I therefore have to solve for the
responses in each of the countries, aggregate the responses and then evaluate the solution.
E¤ects on market structure In Table 7 I show the market shares of di¤erent size classes
and changes in total sales and emissions after abatement. Technology adoption causes very
moderate shifts in the importance of each size class. The share of vans and subcompacts
slightly increases from 16% and 39% to 18% and 42%. Compacts, intermediate and standard
vehicles all lose some market share. This nding is in stark contrast with substitution
from sales-mix abatement. In this case subcompact vehicles and compact vehicles have a
21It is important to note that I exactly solve for the level of technology or the shadow cost such that the
regulation is just binding. Each of the rmssales weighted emissions will end exactly on the policy lines as
plotted in Figure 4. In reality, this does not need to be the case as rms may deviate from the standard and
choose to pay nes.
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combined share of 72% (up from 61%). All other classes lose market share. The di¤erence
between technology adoption and sales-mix abatement is even more pronounced under the
at standard as the target function does not vary between size classes. The combined share
of subcompacts and compacts now rises to 78%. In sum, this shows that adding technology
to new vehicles does not change the size distribution of the car eet. If rms abate with
sales mixing we see large substitution towards smaller vehicles. A slope in the target function
moderates this, though only to a certain extent. This nding is somewhat surprising since
one of the stated reasons for the introduction of the attribute function was to keep the size
distribution constant. Panel I in Figure 4 clearly shows that the attribute function is not
steep enough to attain this goal: most vehicles that are under the diagonal line weigh less
than 1600 kg.
Under technology adoption, total sales increase by 11% (ABR) and 10% (at standard).
Under sales-mix abatement I nd a decrease in total sales of 3% for the ABR and an increase
of 2% for the at standard. The regulation, aimed at decreasing emissions from new vehicles,
results in higher total vehicle sales in three of the four scenarios. The reasons are twofold.
Under technology adoption total sales increase because of a rebound e¤ect on the extensive
margin. The average vehicle delivers a higher utility for consumers because it is more fuel
e¢ cient and consumers switch towards buying a vehicle from the outside good. Under
sales-mix abatement the product characteristics of the vehicle eet remain constant but the
relative prices change. As explained above, vehicles that are more fuel e¢ cient than the
target receive an implicit subsidy and vehicles with a lower fuel e¢ ciency are taxed. When
the required subsidies are larger than the required taxes total sales might increase. This
logic is similar to that developed in Holland, Hughes and Knittel (2009), who show that the
impact of low carbon fuel standards on the extensive margin is uncertain. The change in
total sales depends on the own and cross price elasticities of all the products in the market
as well as the changes in the prices needed to attain the standard. With the at standard
the subsidized part of the market gains more sales than the taxed part loses, causing a 2%
overall increase in sales. This attribute-based standard lowers sales by 3%.
Overall technology adoption thus results in modest e¤ects on total emissions (decrease
of 7%) because more consumers decide to buy a vehicle and there is no substitute to smaller
vehicles.22. So despite overall e¢ ciency gains in vehicles of more than 14% emissions decrease
by just 7% and 50% of the e¢ ciency gains are lost due to the rebound e¤ect on the extensive
22Total emissions is the sum over all new vehicles of the grams of CO2 per km of each vehicle multiplied
by the average yearly mileage, assumed to be constant at 14 000 km/year.
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margin.23. Under sales-mix abatement with an attribute-based regulation total emissions
decrease by 18% (due to the decrease in car sales) and 14% with the at standard (there is
a slight increase in total sales but consumers do buy more fuel e¢ cient cars.
Welfare e¤ects Table 8 gives the changes in consumer surplus, prots, and externalities.
These numbers should be interpreted as total vehicle lifetime changes from yearly sales. I
assume a vehicle lifetime of 15 years and a discount rate of 6% to capitalize the yearly
gains/losses in externalities.24 The amount consumers drive is assumed to be constant,
ignoring possible rebound e¤ects on the intensive margin.
Consumer surplus from new vehicles increases by e15 billion per year under technology
adoption with the ABR and e14 billion with the at standard. The increase in prices due
to higher marginal costs do not make up for the decreases in fuel costs over the vehicle
lifetime and this makes consumers better o¤. These ndings are in stark contrast with the
e¤ects on consumer surplus from sales-mix abatement. With sales-mix abatement consumer
surplus would have decreased by e16 billion (ABR) and e8 billion (at regulation) because
high prices force consumers to smaller cars. The at standard results in signicantly lower
consumer losses because a much larger part of the market is implicitly subsidized. Figure
4, Panel I, shows that more vehicles are under the at target line than under the upward
sloping target, such that the required substitution is less pronounced. These ndings are
important in the sense that the incidence of the regulation shifts with the di¤erent abatement
strategies. This is very di¤erent than the conclusion that is drawn in the literature that
empirically evaluates the CAFE standard and has treated technology improvement more
as a long run response, thereby stressing the cost of the regulation for consumers. The
nding that the EU market fully responds with technology adoption which causes increases
in consumer surplus might partly explain why this type of regulation is a popular option for
policy makers compared to fuel taxes.
The conclusions with respect to the e¤ects on rm prots are less clear. Variable prots
increase by e7 billion under technology adoption (mainly due to new vehicle sales) and
decrease starkly, by e10 billion under sales-mixing. The sum of changes in variable prots
hides interesting patterns between the di¤erent rms on which I comment below. The
23See Gillingham, Kotchen, Rapson and Wagner (2013) for an overview on the rebound e¤ect. A second
rebound e¤ect that might be expected is an increase in vehicle usage, or a rebound e¤ect on the intensive
margin. A further rebound e¤ect could come from the use of savings on vehicle expenses on other energy
intensive activities. This is known as the indirect rebound e¤ect. Lastly, a decrease in the demand for fuels
might lower the price of oil causing further shocks in the economy (known as the macro-economic rebound
e¤ect).
24Yearly mileage and vehicle lifetime are chosen to match statistics reported by Eurostat.
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total e¤ect of the regulation on rms is unclear however because I lack information on the
xed costs of technology adoption. These costs are twofold: technology adoption requires
adaptation of production lines as well as investments in R&D, both of which are unobserved.
Below I discuss possible scenarios of why rms did not make these investments in fuel
e¢ ciency before the regulation.
The gains from the reduction in CO2 emissions are small in comparison to the other
reported e¤ects. I value a ton of CO2 at e28.25 The total gains from reduced emissions are
smaller than 10% of gains or losses in consumer surplus or variable prots in all simulations.
With technology adoption a moderate e380 million is gained per year while sales mix-
abatement leads to gains of almost e1 billion. In total 2.6 million tons of CO2 would be
saved under sales-mix abatement and the attribute-based standard. This saving would cost
e25 billion in consumer and producer surplus which leads to a cost of e 9615 per ton and
shows that the policy would have been extremely costly had rms responded by sales-mixing.
A nal e¤ect of the regulation are changes in other external costs from tra¢ c such
as accident risk, local pollution and congestion, which is related to the total amount of
vehicle miles in a year. Parry, Walls and Harrington (2007) give the total external cost from
driving for the US market. The number Parry et al. (2007) compute is probably not directly
applicable to the EU market but at least gives a sense of the relative importance of these
e¤ects. I take this number to be e12 cent per kilometer, at best an approximation. I nd
that with technology adoption the increase in these externalities due to increased sales easily
o¤set all gains from emissions reductions. Other external costs increase by more than e17
billion from technology adoption. Sales-mix abatement under the attribute standard is the
only simulation that results in less total sales and so results in e4.3 billion decrease in other
external costs. Since external costs from congestion and accident risk are estimated to be
higher than the external costs of CO2 emissions a regulation that does not get the extensive
margin right will increase the amount of total external costs instead of decrease. Emission
standards lead to increased sales when the abatement strategy is technology adoption or
when the subsidized part of the market gains more sales than the taxed part loses and thus
are an inadequate instrument to decrease the total amount of external e¤ects in the car
market.
To conclude, I nd that the incidence of the regulation shifts with the abatement strategy:
25This number comes from the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon. Even severe
increases in the cost of carbon by a magnitude of 5 (or more than e100 per ton which is considered to be a
high estimate in the literature) would still mean the other e¤ects in the table would be of a larger magnitude.
A ton of CO2 traded for e7.75 in the EU cap and trade system at the end of 2013.
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consumer surplus increases by a signicant amount under technology adoption and decreases
strongly under sales-mixing. This might partly explain why this type of regulation is a
popular option among policy makers. Next, the simulations show that emission standards
are not an e¤ective instrument to reduce externalities from the car market. The rebound
e¤ect on the extensive margin is considerable under technology adoption. Because other
externalities related to increased tra¢ c are typically more costly than emissions there is no
overall reduction in externalities and the regulation does not attain its goal. When rms
respond with sales-mixing a decrease in tra¢ c is possible but the savings in externalities do
not outweigh the loss in consumer surplus and prots and the overall e¤ect of the regulation
is clearly negative. The sales-mix abatement scenarios can be seen as a lower bound for
the total welfare e¤ects since technology adoption is the preferred revealed strategy by rms
sales-mixing must be more costly. The technology scenarios can be regarded as an absolute
upper bound on the regulation, before deducting the xed technology costs and further
rebound e¤ects.
Incidence on di¤erent rms Here I compare the design of the current attribute-based
regulation with the at standard to see whether the impact on di¤erent rms changes between
the designs. In Table 9 I give the sales weighted CO2 emissions per rm for both the attribute-
based and the at standard. For each of the simulations I report the level of technology or
the shadow cost that was needed to force each rm onto the target function and the e¤ects
on variable yearly prots in e millions. The sales weighted CO2 emissions of each rm with
the up-sloping target function vary with their average weight. This is most outspoken for
BMW that reaches the standard with emission of 134 g CO2/km and Fiat that reaches the
standard with 116 g CO2/km. The total sales weighted level of emissions is 124 g CO2/km
and that is the required level I set for the at standard.
With attribute-basing the technology e¤orts  f needed are largest for Daimler, Volkswa-
gen and the Asian rms who all need to bring their CO2 emission down by more than 20%
in order to comply. Note that these are indeed the rms with the largest distance from the
regulation in Figure 3. Technology abatement under the at standard results in exactly the
same picture except that the e¤ort that is needed from each rm changes somewhat. BMW
now needs to increase e¢ ciency by 19% (up from 13%) and Fiat by 8% (down from 14%).
This matches the expectation as BMW cannot exploit the reduction on their heavy cars
and Fiat does not have to increase e¢ ciency of their lighter vehicles. The large increases in
e¢ ciency result in more variable prots for all of the rms, except for BMW. Volkswagen
and the Asian rms gain most. In sum, the attribute-based standard clearly changes the
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technology e¤ort that is needed from each rm.
The results of the sales-mix abatement in Table 9 show some interesting patterns. Under
the attribute standard three rms, BMW, Ford and PSA, have a vehicle eet that is best
adapted to the standard (in practice: they have most vehicles underneath or close to the
diagonal line in Figure 4). These three rms thus face the lowest shadow costs and need to
distort their prices signicantly less than all the other rms. BMW, Ford and PSA increase
prots by about e1 billion while all the other rms lose between e 300 million and e 4.4
billion. Under the at standard the set of rms with the most adapted eet changes to Fiat,
PSA and Renault, which all face lower shadow costs and increase prots. Under sales-mixing
there are two important di¤erences between the attribute-based and the at standard: the
marginal compliance cost changes and the distribution of compliance costs changes. I discuss
these two di¤erences in detail.
The change in the marginal compliance costs is potentially very important as it makes
technology adoption more likely than sales-mix abatement. In equilibrium rms will choose
to use an abatement strategy as long as the marginal abatement costs are lower than that of
an other strategy. Firms might as well apply a mixture of strategies. The empirical results
obtained here show that f is considerably higher than 
0
f for most of the rms (except for
BMW). The mean of the marginal shadow cost of sales mixing goes up from 1.37 to 2.39
which means that the strategy of sales mixing on average becomes twice as costly on the
margin. The incentives to invest in technology thus increase signicantly because of the
slope in the target function. This might be one of the reasons why we have seen such a clear
choice for technology adoption in respons to the EU standard. The recent reform of the
CAFE standard also includes a slope in the target function which makes future technology
adoption in the US more likely.26 The upward slope in the target function makes sales-mix
abatement more costly but the results are not so strong to state that a slope in the target
function is a necessary condition to get technology abatement. With a at target the prot
losses for most rms from sales-mix abatement are so large that at least some technology
investment is expected.27
The changes in the distribution of compliance costs are in line with the lobbying by dif-
ferent countries as described above. The French (Renault and PSA) and Italian (Fiat) rms
26The improvements in fuel e¢ ciency obained in the EU might also spill over into other markets, creating
positive externalities.
27Additionally, the attribute-based function might potentially change the costs of compliance from down-
sizing as well as the direction of the downsizing. The attribute-based target clearly gives an incentive not to
lower weight when choosing to downsize the eet. Whitefoot and Skerlos (2012) simulate this possibility for
the footprint based target in the CAFE standards.
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face lower shadow costs with the at standard than with the attribute-based standard. This
is in line with the strong positions the countries took when bargaining over the regulation.
Still, the French and Italian rms in general face a lower regulatory burden. A steeper tar-
get function (the Germans proposed a slope a = 0:06 instead of 0:04) would have resulted
in lower e¤ort needed from the German rms. The policy debate in 2007, as reported in
newspapers and by Deters (2010), focused mainly on this distributional issues and not on
the e¤ect of the slope on the likelihood of di¤erent abatement strategies.
Ito and Sallee (2014) point out one other possibly important e¤ect of attribute-based
regulation. If the costs of increasing fuel e¢ ciency are higher for heavier vehicles, the slope
of the target function might equalize abatement costs and bring the market closer to an
equilibrium that would be reached under a cap and trade system. That might make the
regulation more cost-e¢ cient and mimic a trading system that might be infeasible for political
or practical reasons. When the regulation would be a cap and trade system all rms would
face exactly the same shadow costs such that f = . The coe¢ cient of variation of 
0
f with
a at target is 0:55, higher than with an up-sloping target f = 0:48. The equalization of
abatement cost is thus very limited. Also, when we look at the technology e¤orts needed
(assuming the technology e¤ort translates literally into costs), there is almost no equalization.
The coe¢ cient of variation for the e¤ort goes from 0:33 to 0:31. The reason for the limited
increase in equalization of compliance costs is twofold. First, the regulation is binding on
the level of the rm and not on the level of a single product. Since all rms sell products
in the di¤erent size classes rms are already able to equalize costs between their wide range
of products. Second, a simple linear function of weight is probably not a very good t to
actual di¤erences in compliance costs between large rms.
Incentives to invest in fuel e¢ ciency The numbers given above raise the question why
the regulation was necessary to spark investment in fuel e¢ ciency. In Table 10 I endow each
of the rms with a 5% increase in fuel e¢ ciency. Each column gives the e¤ects on prots
of all rms after a new Nash equilibrium is reached. The diagonal of the table gives the
yearly return in variable prots from the technology investment (provided that the other
rms respond only by changing prices). The table shows that each rm can increase variable
prots compared to the status quo by investing in fuel e¢ ciency. If there are private gains
to be made by investing in technology, why then did rms invest such a limited amount in
fuel e¢ ciency up until 2007?
A rst answer to this could be investment ine¢ ciencies of the consumer. If consumers
do not value future fuel cost savings to the full extent, rms will not be able to increase
36
sales after investments in fuel e¢ ciency. Grigolon, Reynaert and Verboven (2014) nd that
consumer investment ine¢ ciencies in the EU are not large (consumers value future savings
at more than 80%). Allcott and Wozny (2012) report a somewhat lower number for the
US. As the exercise in table 10 shows, as well as the overall results, consumers do increase
demand in response to increases in fuel economy and this channel cannot explain why rms
hardly invested in fuel e¢ ciency up until 2007.
A second channel might be market failures in the supply and adoption of technology.
Ja¤e, Newell and Stavins (2005) discuss market failures associated with innovation and
di¤usion of technologies. A rst market failure might be spillovers in technology, such that
innovation has a positive externality. Second, there might be positive externalities related to
the adoption of new technologies. A third channel might be incomplete information about
future returns of the investment. In the car market this could be relevant as fuel prices
and taxation vary extensively over time. The result of these market failures could be a
socially suboptimal equilibrium with no or too little investment and technology adoption.
The regulation gives clear and binding e¢ ciency targets for the whole industry and thus
might succeed in moving the industry out of this suboptimal equilibrium and to induce
technology adoption. It is perhaps striking that the industry itself agreed to step into a
nonbinding agreement in 1998, but failed to reach the targets.28 The voluntary agreement
aimed to bring each producerssales weighted emissions down to 140 g CO2/km by 2008.
The agreement is considered a failure as only the small car makers Fiat, PSA and Renault
came close to the goal and strong reductions in emissions only happened after 2007, when
the binding regulation was announced.
Testing this hypothesis of a market failure in technology adoption would require data
on the xed costs of R&D related to fuel e¢ ciency and a dynamic model of technology
investment, which is out of scope for this paper. Recent work has looked at R&D patterns in
the automobile industry. Hashmi and Van Biesebroeck (2012) estimate and solve a dynamic
model to look at the relation between industry concentration and innovation exploiting
variation in the number of rms through globalization. Aghion et al. (2012) present evidence,
by looking at patents, that rms invest more in the development of electric and hybrid engines
in periods of high fuel prices. They also nd strong evidence for path dependency: rms
that previously invested in green technology are more likely to continue these investments.
Also, Klier and Linn (2013) look at the impact of regulation on the pace of technology
improvement and nd signicant e¤ects of regulation on the pace of technology adoption.
28This agreement is known as the ACEA agreement.
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Further empirical evidence on the degree and the causes of underinvestment in technology
would be useful to further evaluate the policy. Several interesting questions remain to be
answered. Are emission standards a useful policy instrument to solve for technology adoption
failures? What is the optimal level of the standard in that case? How do the e¤ects of
standards compare with other policy options like innovation subsidies and tax credits? To
what extent should these measures be combined with more direct externality taxes? All
major car markets in the world are currently subject to a system of fuel taxes, sales taxes,
targeted subsidies and emission or fuel e¢ ciency standards. The interplay of those di¤erent
taxes and regulations and the margins they address remain fertile ground for research.
7 Conclusion
This paper has evaluated the response to a recent emission standard that was announced for
the European Union in 2007. I nd that between 2007 and 2011 sales weighted emissions
from new vehicle sales have decreased by more than 14%. The decrease is fully explained
by rms response to the regulation. Firms choose to abate emissions by installing new
technology in engines that increases fuel e¢ ciency for the whole vehicle eet. Firms do not
change their sales-mix, nor do they release signicantly downsized vehicles in the years after
the regulation. I nd that, because of the large improvement in technology adoption, the
regulation has a large positive e¤ect on consumers. The incidence of the regulation thus
fully falls on producers. Overall, I nd that greenhouse gas emissions from new vehicle sales
reduce by 7%. Despite the 14% gains in e¢ ciency, emissions go down by only 7% because
a large rebound e¤ect on the extensive margin. A back of the envelope calculation shows
that because of the increase in total sales, other external costs such as accident risk and
increased congestion o¤set all of the gains in emission reduction. I nd that the e¤ects
of the regulation would have been very di¤erent if rms had responded by changing the
relative prices of products in order to get a sales-mix with better fuel e¢ ciency. This would
have resulted in large losses in consumer surplus and variable prots but more savings in
greenhouse gas emissions (up to 18%). The overall welfare e¤ects of this abatement strategy
would have been in the order of negative e20 billion, making it a very costly regulation to
reduce emissions.
Next, I nd that the attribute-based design of the regulation, so that the emission target
varies with average weight of each producer, makes sales-mix abatement much more costly
for rms and thus increases the likelihood that rms will increase their pace of technology
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adoption. In general, the di¤erence in welfare e¤ect between sales-mix abatement and tech-
nology adoption show that policy makers should design the regulation such that the latter
strategy is chosen. Attribute-based regulation might be one of the tools to achieve that, as
well as providing a clear and long enough time path for the abatement combined with heavy
fees for breaking the standard.
Finally, I would like to end with some cautionary remarks. The numbers derived in
this paper are obtained under some strong assumptions. Contrary to most other work,
I do specically test the performance of the structural model to explain observed market
outcomes. However, one should keep in mind the limitations of the model. First of all,
the model does not allow to predict the size of the outside good (not choosing to buy a
vehicle) out of sample, the model does not account for the strong decline in sales observed
between 2007-2011. I do predict however, that this decline in sales might have been more
severe if fuel e¢ ciency had not increased. Second, I do focus only on sales of new vehicles
and assume implicitly there will be no e¤ects on prices and vehicle lifetimes in the second
hand market. I expect the e¤ects of technology adoption on the existing vehicle eet to be
very di¤erent from those of sales-mixing. Third, all welfare numbers are obtained ignoring
possible rebound e¤ects on driving behavior. Fourth, I do not observe any of the xed costs
related to implementing and inventing the new technology related to fuel e¢ ciency. Each of
these issues could be interesting for further research but require either a di¤erent empirical
approach or additional data.
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8 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Emission Standards and Abatement Strategies
Flat and Attribute-based Regulation Production Possibility Frontier
Panel I plots the target function for a at and attribute-based (ABR) regulation in a plot with CO2
emissions on the vertical axis and product characteristics X on the horizontal axis. The at standard
has the same target for each vehicle, the ABR varies with X. Products on or underneath the target
line contribute to compliance with the regulation. Panel II plots the same regulations and adds the
production possibility frontier for di¤erent technology levels  and e . The area above the production
possibility frontier gives all possible product combinations and expands as technology improves from
 to e . Three possible abatement strategies are the following: 1. Sales-Mixing: increase prices of
products above the target (A and B for the at regulation, A and D for the ABR) and decrease prices
of products below the target (C and D for the at regulation, B and C for the ABR); 2. Downsizing:
design and sell new products below the target, given the current production possibility frontier  (C
and D for the at regulation, B and C for the ABR); 3. Technology Adoption: increase technology
from  to e such that the set of possible product combinations below the target increases.
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Figure 2: Sales Weighted Characteristics over Time
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The gure shows the evolution of quantity weighted characteristics from 1998 until 2011, indexed
at 1998. The EU trends represent the evolution of sales weighted characteristics as observed in the
data. In the EU CO2 emissions decrease by 20%, horsepower and weight increase by 22% and 13%.
The US trends represent the evolution of production weighted characteristics as reported by the EPA
(http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fetrends.htm). In the US CO2 emissions decrease by 10%, horsepower
and weight increase by 34% and 10%.
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Figure 3: Compliance of Firms in 2007 and 2011
The gure shows the response of each of the rms to the regulation. The starting point of each
arrow gives the sales weighted CO2 and mass for each producer in 2007 as observed in the data. The
end of each arrow gives the same point in 2011. The dashed diagonal line is the regulation, fully
binding in 2015.
46
Figure 4: Policy Simulations
Start of policy simulation Attribute standard
Flat standard
The gure shows each vehicle in a CO2-weight diagram. CO2 is in g/100km and weight is in 1000kg.
The diagonal line represent the attribute based standard and the horizontal line is the at standard.
The rst panel gives the vehicle eet at the start of the simulation and shows all vehicles sold in 2007
with a fuel e¢ ciency improvement of 6.4%. When rms respond with sales-mix abatement the target
must be reached with this set of vehicles, such that only points under the diagonal (horizontal) line
help with attaining the attribute-based (at) standard. The second panel gives the set of vehicles
after full technology adoption to the attribute-based standard (the diagonal line is binding). The
third panel gives the set of vehicles after full technology adoption to the at standard (the horizontal
line is binding).
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Table 1: Sales weighted vehicle characteristics in 2007 and 2011
Characteristics 2007 2011 % Change
CO2 (in g/km) 147 126 -14%
Horsepower (in kW) 77 80 3%
Footprint (in m2) 7.2 7.4 2%
Weight (in kg) 1271 1280 1%
Diesel 56% 56% 0%
CO2 (in g/km) per class 2007 2011 % Change
Subcompact 130 115 -12%
Compact 145 125 -14%
Intermediate 157 132 -16%
Standard 159 136 -15%
Luxury 182 145 -20%
Compact Van 153 134 -12%
SUV 206 154 -25%
Sports 174 145 -17%
The upper panel of the table presents vehicle characteristics that are sales weighted over the 7
observed countries in 2007 and 2011. The lower panel gives the sales weighted CO2 emissions per
size class. The last column presents the percentage di¤erence in characteristics between 2007 and
2011.
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Table 2: Trade-o¤ Estimates between CO2 Emissions Characteristics
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
ln(Hp) 0.18*** 0.26*** 0.16*** 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.05 0.17***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02)
ln(Weight) 0.66*** 0.54*** 0.63*** 0.70*** 0.63*** 0.81*** 0.80***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
ln(Footprint) -0.16* -0.14* -0.16* -0.15 -0.11 -0.16* -0.29***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
ln(Height) 0.41*** 0.30** 0.43*** 0.40*** 0.31** 0.42*** 0.29**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09)
Diesel -0.20*** -0.83*** -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.21***
(0.01) (0.20) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Price 0.03
(0.03)
Marginal Cost -0.02
(0.02)
Year F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DieselChar.? Yes
YearChar.? Yes
YearFirm? Yes
Observations 12,659 12,659 12,659 12,659 132106 12,659 12,659
R2 0,82 0,83 0,84 0,83 0,81 0,83 0,83
This table gives the trade-o¤ parameters  between characteristics and emissions from equation (10).
Robust standard errors are reported between brackets and clustered per rm, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
*p<0.10. Model 1 is estimated with ols and includes only year xed e¤ects, Model 2 includes diesel
by characteristic interactions, Model 3 includes price as an explanatory variable, Model 4 includes
marginal costs (as estimated from the structural model), Model 5 is a weighted least square using
sales as frequency weights, Model 6 interacts the time trend with characteristics and Model 7 allows
for a di¤erent time trend for each model.
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Table 3: Technological Progress Estimates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
1999 2% 1% 1% 2% 2% -1%
2000 -2% 0% -1% -2% -1% -3%
2001 2% 0% 2% 2% 1% -2%
2002 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% -1%
2003 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3%
2004 2% 2% 3% 2% 2% 2%
2005 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 4%
2006 2% 1% 2% 2% 1% 3%
2007 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1%
2008 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4%
2009 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3%
2010 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 7%
2011 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 2%
Average Technology Growth
1998-2007 1.6% 1.3% 1.4% 1.6% 1.4% 0.7%
2008-2011 4.3% 4.3% 4.3% 4.3% 4.0% 4.0%
The table gives the estimated yearly change of technology in the CO2 production function as derived
from the year xed e¤ects in (10). Each of the estimated models corresponds to Table 2, rm specic
technology paths for Model 7 are given in the appendix. The shaded area are years after the policy
announcement.
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Table 4: Decomposing the Decrease in Emmisions
All Vehicles Existing Models (2007) New Models (>2007)
No Tech. Tech. No Tech. Tech. No Tech. Tech.
True ejt bejt ejt bejt ejt bejt
1998 169 151 172 151 172
1999 168 152 170 152 170
2000 169 151 172 151 172
2001 167 152 170 152 170
2002 164 152 168 152 168
2003 161 152 164 152 164
2004 158 153 161 153 161
2005 156 153 158 153 158
2006 154 154 157 154 157
2007 151 154 154 154 154
2008 147 153 148 153 148 161 156
2009 142 154 144 153 143 163 151
2010 135 154 137 154 136 157 138
2011 130 155 131 154 130 157 132
The table reports observed and predicted levels of sales weighted CO2 emissions. Emissions are
corrected with the attribute function f(wj) and represent the actual target values for the regulation.
All predictions use the estimates from Table 2 Model 1. The columns ejt contain sales weighted
predicted emissions keeping technology constant at  t = 2007. The columns bejt contain sales
weighted predicted values for emissions with estimated  t. For each measure I report results for all
vehicle models, models released not later than 2007 and models released after 2007. The shaded
area are years after the policy announcement.
51
Table 5: Estimation Results
Demand Estimation
Logit RC logit
Mean Valuation St. Dev. Mean Valuation St. Dev.
Param. St.Err. Param. St.Err. Param. St.Err. Param. St.Err.
Price/Inc. -3.894 0.288 - - -3.690 0.275
Fuel Cons. (e/km) -0.259 0.010 - - -0.342 0.028 0.116 0.049
Horsepower 1.355 0.191 - - -0.928 0.249 2.009 0.191
Weight 1.620 0.163 - - 1.941 0.175 0.169 0.348
Footprint 0.281 0.034 - - 0.283 0.037 0.064 0.045
Height 0.015 0.016 - - 0.004 0.016
Foreign -0.864 0.023 - - -0.904 0.047 0.405 0.260
Marginal Cost Estimation
Logit RC logit
Perfect Comp. Imp. Comp. Perfect Comp. Imp. Comp.
Param. St.Err. Param. St.Err. Param. St.Err. Param. St.Err.
Fuel Cons. (Li/100km) -0.037 0.001 -0.025 0.001 -0.037 0.001 -0.087 0.001
Horsepower 0.574 0.005 0.439 0.005 0.574 0.005 0.973 0.008
Weight 0.595 0.009 0.452 0.009 0.595 0.009 0.980 0.016
Footprint 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.081 0.004
Height 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002
Foreign -0.026 0.003 -0.043 0.003 -0.026 0.003 0.045 0.004
Log Labor Cost Proxy 0.169 0.007 0.083 0.007 0.169 0.007 0.417 0.013
Production in market -0.013 0.002 -0.009 0.002 -0.013 0.002 -0.031 0.004
The Table reports estimated parameters for the demand and marginal cost equations. Demand is
estimated with a Logit and a Random Coe¢ cient Logit. Marginal Costs are derived and estimated
using the rst order conditions of the prot function under the assumption of perfect competition
and a Nash Bertrand game in prices (imperfect competition).
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Table 6: Out of sample t of sales weighted characteristics
Perfect Competition Imperfect Competition
Observed Logit RC Logit Logit RC Logit
Sales Weighted: Within Sample Fit (2007)
CO2 (in g/km) 147 149 148 149 149
Price/Income 0.71 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.71
Horsepower (in kW) 78 81 79 81 80
Weight (in kg) 1271 1293 1283 1289 1285
Footprint (in m2) 7.2 7.3 7.2 7.3 7.3
Diesel 56% 54% 53% 54% 52%
Out of Sample Fit (2011)
CO2 (in g/km) 126 130 129 130 129
Price/Income 0.69 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.74
Horsepower (in kW) 80 87 85 87 85
Weight (in kg) 1280 1319 1314 1317 1307
Footprint (in m2) 7.4 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
Diesel 56% 57% 56% 57% 56%
This Table gives the sales weighted characteristics using predicted quantities and prices in 2007 and
2011. For each of the estimated models in Table 5 I solve for quantities and prices within and out
of sample given the estimated parameters.
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Table 7: Market shares per size class
Technology Adoption Sales Mix
2007 ABR Flat ABR Flat
Market Shares
Subcompact 39 42 41 49 59
Compact 22 20 21 23 19
Inter. 8 6 6 5 3
Standard 6 5 5 5 4
Luxury 3 2 2 2 1
Van 16 18 18 14 12
SUV 5 5 5 1 1
Sports 2 2 2 1 1
Aggregate E¤ects
Total Sales 11% 10% -3% 2%
Total CO2 Emissions -7% -7% -18% -14%
The table gives the market shares of di¤erent size classes and the e¤ect of the regulation on total
sales and emissions. The rst column gives the observed market shares in 2007. In the next columns
give the market shares from policy simulations with an attribute-based (ABR) and a at regulation,
technology adoption and sales-mix abatement. For each simulation estimated parameters from the
RC logit with imperfect competition from Table 5 are used.
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Table 8: Welfare E¤ects
Technology Adoption Sales Mixing
 in billion es: ABR Flat ABR Flat
Consumers:
 Consumer Surplus 15.10 14.40 -15.81 -8.00
Firms:
 Variable Prots 7.71 7.34 -10.33 -9.26
 Fixed Costs ? ? 0 0
Externalities:
 CO2 Savings 0.38 0.37 0.98 0.74
 Other Externality Savings -17.25 -16.66 4.32 -3.96
 Total: ]...,5.94] ]...,5.45] -20.84 -20.49
The table gives aggregated e¤ects over all markets and rms for each policy simulation. The table
reports the total change in welfare in billion e over the total expected lifetime of the vehicle. A
vehicle is expected to live for 15 years and to have an annual mileage of 14 000 km per year, the
discount rate is 6%. A ton of CO2 is valued at e28 (this value is taken from the interagency working
group on social cost of carbon). Other externalities are valued at 12cent per kilometer following
Parry et al. (2007). Other externalities include local pollution, congestion, and accident risk.
Table 9: Prots and Emission per rm
Target Technology Adoption Sales Mixing
ABR Flat ABR Flat ABR Flat
CO2 CO2  f  Prot 
0
f  Prot f  Prot 
0
f  Prot
BMW 134 124 0,13 -400 0,19 -193 1,15 1118 1.77 -954
Daimler 121 124 0,23 384 0,22 314 3,03 -1590 1.18 -1177
Fiat 116 124 0,14 737 0,08 173 3,43 -1810 0.53 347
Ford 126 124 0,12 249 0,13 500 1,32 890 1.70 -206
GM 125 124 0,15 847 0,16 995 3,78 -2333 2.86 -2122
PSA 123 124 0,09 197 0,08 164 0,80 1784 0.38 1325
Renault 120 124 0,13 554 0,11 368 2,09 -308 0.86 396
VW 125 124 0,20 3081 0,21 3470 2,13 -4413 1.73 -5804
Asian 118 124 0,22 2060 0,19 1548 3,84 -3664 1.37 -1069
The table gives sales weighted emissions in grams of CO2 per km for each rm for both the attribute-
based and the at standard. The level of technology adoption and the shadow costs f of the
regulation is given such that each rm exactly reaches the target. The di¤erence in prots between
estimated 2007 prots and prots obtained in each of the simulations are in million es.
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Table 10: Incentives to Invest in Fuel E¢ ciency
Firm increases fuel e¢ ciency by 5%
BMW Daimler Fiat Ford GM PSA Renault VW Asian
BMW 137 -13 -17 -28 -33 -27 -18 -58 -34
Daimler -6 185 -14 -18 -23 -18 -13 -48 -24
Fiat -4 -9 518 -29 -33 -38 -20 -42 -33
Ford -10 -10 -27 511 -42 -40 -23 -64 -46
GM -11 -12 -27 -39 577 -40 -24 -68 -46
PSA -5 -7 -33 -39 -43 709 -58 -69 -52
Renault -2 -4 -17 -21 -23 -50 442 -39 -29
VW -25 -38 -47 -86 -101 -85 -55 1176 -127
Asian -9 -11 -30 -46 -51 -54 -34 -85 670
Total 65 81 306 204 229 357 197 703 278
The table gives the di¤erence in variable prots from the status quo from increasing fuel e¢ ciency
by 5%. Column 1 gives the e¤ect of a fuel e¢ ciency increase for BMW on all other rms after
reaching a new Nash equilibrium in prices, column 2 gives the e¤ect of an increase in Daimlers fuel
e¢ ciency on all rms variable prots, etc. Numbers are in e millions. The last row gives the sum
of each column.
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Appendix
Details on Data Selection
I focus the analysis on the largest EU rms that sell more than 50 000 vehicles in each year
of the sample. These are: BMW, Daimler, Fiat, Ford, GM, PSA, Renault and Volkswagen. I
consider the largest Asian manufacturers as being one rm in the model. This rm includes:
Honda, Hyundai, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Suzuki and Toyota. The following rms are not
considered in the analysis: Alpina, Aston Martin, Brilliance Auto, Chana, DR Motor, Geely
Group, Great Wall, Isuzu, Jensen, Jiangling, Lada, Mahindra & Mahindra, MG Rover,
Morgan, Perodua, Porsche, Proton, SAIC, Santana, Spyker, Ssangyin, Subaru, Tata, TVR,
Venturi and Wiesmann. Daimler and Chrysler merged during the sample period an I will
treat them as one and the same rm in the whole sample.
For the included rms I focus on the most popular brands. I drop the following brands
which mostly include luxurious sports cars and temporary owned brands: Abarth, Bentley,
Buick, Cadillic, Corvette, Daimler, Dodge, Ferrari, Galloper, Hummer, Inniti, Innocenti,
Iveco, Jaguar, Lamborghini, Land Rover, Lincoln, Maserati, Maybach, Pontiac, Rolls-Royce
and Tata.
In total the rms and brands that are not included account for 3.5% of the sales.
Additionally, to reduce the number of observations I select only the 50% most selling
models which are a combination of a Brand/Model/Body indicator, e.g. "Volkswagen Golf
Hatchback". Of the 50% most popular models I select the engine variants that are sold at
least 20 times. Because of this selection, that is necessary to make the number of market
share equations tractable, I loose another 14% of sales such that the nal data set includes
81.5% of total reported sales. I lose another 3% of total reported sales due to missing values
and unrealistic outliers in the characteristics.
The denition of the variable weight changes throughout the sample from curb weight
before 2010 to gross vehicle weight in the years 2010 and 2011. I transform the gross vehicle
weight to curb weight by matching vehicles that are identical in all characteristics between
2009 and 2010. I regress curb weight on gross vehicle weight, doors and displacement and
use the predicted value of that regression to obtain curb weight in 2010 and 2011. The
R2 of that regression is 0.95. Curb weight is about 72% lower than gross vehicle weight.
Observed and imputed curb weight are then used to compute each vehicles compliance with
the regulation.
i
Technology Estimates for Individual Firms
Table A1: Technological Progress Estimates per Firm
BMW Daimler Fiat Ford GM PSA Renault VW Asian
1999 0% 3% 2% 9% 1% 2% 3% 1% -2%
2000 -3% -3% 2% -8% -3% 0% 1% -1% 0%
2001 4% 4% 3% 4% 0% 5% 1% 0% 2%
2002 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 2% 2% 1% 4%
2003 0% 2% 3% 2% 3% 1% 3% 2% 3%
2004 0% 2% 1% 3% 4% 7% 3% 1% 1%
2005 1% 4% 1% 2% 2% 2% 0% 2% 1%
2006 3% 1% 4% 1% 1% 2% 3% 1% 1%
2007 10% 1% 3% 0% 2% 3% 1% 1% 3%
2008 6% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 0% 4% 3%
2009 2% 5% 4% 1% 3% 2% 4% 6% 6%
2010 -1% 3% 7% 7% 8% 4% 4% 6% 4%
2011 3% 6% 6% 7% 6% 5% 3% 4% 3%
Average Technology Growth
1998-2007 1.8% 1.7% 2.2% 1.6% 1.1% 2.7% 1.9% 0.9% 1.4%
2008-2011 2.5% 4.3% 5.0% 4.3% 4.8% 3.3% 2.8% 5.0% 4.0%
The table gives the estimated rm specic yearly change of technology in the CO2 production
function as derived from the year xed e¤ects in (10). The estimates correspond to Model 7 in Table
2. The shaded area are years after the policy announcement.
Algorithm for Policy Simulations
The algorithm follows these steps:
1. Start with a guess for the shadow costs or technology level
2. Solve the Nash equilibrium in prices given the values in 1
3. Compute the market shares given the price equilibrium and the values in 1
4. Compute the sales weighted emission for each of the rm
5. Compute the di¤erence between the value in 4 and the required standard
6. If the di¤erence is smaller than 1e-6 return end, else return to step 1
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